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The Alienage Spectrum Disorder: The Bill of




More than one hundred years of American jurisprudence suggests that some
aliens are more alien than others.' As such, their rights may be understood as lying
along a spectrum ranging from those whose sole contact with the United States is
with United States authorities located in a foreign territory to those who have resided
in the United States for decades, having arrived as infants and acquired United States
citizenship.2
The fundamental notion that increased ties to the polity of the United States
would entitle an alien to better rights is deeply rooted in the jurisprudence. 3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. This article has benefited from the
insights of a number of scholars who think and write about the various aspects of the issues it addresses.
Among them, I would like to thank Professor Richard Delgado, one of the nation's leading experts on
alienage and identity, for taking the time to read a prior draft of the article and suggesting several detailed
improvements. I would also like to thank Professor Victor C. Romero, one of the leading experts in
constitutional immigration law, who challenged some of my assumptions and arguments in written
exchanges as well as oral conversations, and helped me refine my thoughts about these issues. My
appreciation also extends to Professor Robert Chang, one of the leading experts in critical race theory,
who outlined the deficiencies of the prior draft and proposed constructive measures of improvement. This
article would not have attained its current level of clarity of message and coherence without the generous
help of all of them. For that I am deeply indebted. I also would like to thank my research assistant,
Darren Thomson, and administrative assistant, Junsen Ohno, for their help in editing, bluebooking, and
formatting the various drafts of the article. All arguments, errors, and omissions are solely attributable to
me.
1. The term "alien" is a term of art defined under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of
1952, Pub. L. no. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §ll01(a)(3)) and Kevin R.
Johnson, Aliens and the U.S. Immigration Laws: Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 263 (1996-97). See infra part 11 for a detailed discussion of the proposition that
some are more alien than others.
2."The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to
these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country, he becomes invested with the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected
by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens. They extend
their inalienable privileges to all 'persons' and guard against any encroachment on those rights by federal
or state authority." Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring). "The fact that
all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further
conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship, or, indeed, to the
conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification. For a host of
constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens
and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the other; and the class of aliens
is itself a heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties to this country."
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976) (emphasis added).
3. "The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded
a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful
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Ordinarily, these rights tend to strengthen as one moves from the beginning of the
alienage spectrum, which might involve the most attenuated contact, as in the case of
enemy aliens detained by United States military in a foreign land or an overseas visa
applicant, to the end of the spectrum, which might involve a United States citizen.
While this seems to make perfect sense, a closer examination of the century-old
jurisprudence suggests that the spectrum itself is replete with inconsistencies and is
utterly disordered.
Disorder and inconsistencies are found when comparing Johnson v.
Eisentrager with Boumediene v. Bush. In Eisentrager, the Court held that enemy
aliens who have never set foot on United States soil are the worst form of aliens and
do not have constitutional rights.4 In Boumediene v. Bush, however, the Court held
that a similar category of enemy aliens have constitutional rights similar to the rights
of lawful permanent residents or even citizens.5 As discussed in section (II)(a)(i)(1)
below, Boumediene does this without overruling Eisentrager. The disorder in the
alienage spectrum is not, however, a creation of Boumediene. It is as old as the
Chinese Exclusion case of 1889, which consolidated the whole notion of separate
and unequal treatment of aliens and articulated the plenary power doctrine in the
presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights; they
become more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to become a
citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization. During his probationary
residence, this Court has steadily enlarged his right against Executive deportation except upon full and fair
hearing. And, at least since 1886, we have extended to the person and property of resident aliens
important constitutional guaranties-such as the due process of law of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1950). See also e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259 (1990) (requiring a "substantial voluntary" attachment to the U.S. for the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment). For a detailed discussion of this question, see sec. (ll)(a)(i)(3) infra. See also
Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78-79 ("a host of constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a
legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one class not
accorded to the other; and the class of aliens is itself a heterogeneous multitude of persons with wide-
ranging variety of ties to this country.").
4. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770-71.
5. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). Ironically, the procedural irregularities
that the Court refused to tolerate as applied to enemy aliens in Boumediene are the same as or even better
than the rules that apply to long term lawful residents in the immigration context or even citizens in the
terrorism context. See id. at 2287 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). For a thorough exposition of this argument
see infra sec. (ll)(a)(i)(1). As will be elaborated in several sections below, the spectrum is characterized
by the notion of community ties or rootedness. Another example that shows a disorder in the spectrum is
a comparison between the situations of unauthorized long-term residents and authorized newcomers. For
example, while a person who wins a diversity lottery and immigrates to the United State as an adult may
naturalize within five years and claim the full protection of the Bill of Rights, a person who was brought
in without inspection at age one may never be able to claim the full protection of the Bill of Rights even if
he or she is later married to a United States citizen and lives here for decades. See, e.g., INA. sec. 203(c)
(allowing the immigration of diversity visa winners). See also INA sec. 245 (a) (denying adjustment of
status to a person who entered without inspection regardless of the length of stay or nature of the family
relationship and other forms of eligibility for lawful status). Note that even natural born citizens may be
put on another citizenship/alienage spectrum depending on the circumstances, as demonstrated by the
Japanese internment case of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the
constitutionality of an executive order interning Japanese Americans and immigrants alike on grounds of
national security); and the more recent "enemy alien" cases of Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)
(discussing the rights of United States citizens captured in the United States on allegations of terrorism)
and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (discussing the rights of a United States citizen captured in
Afghanistan on allegations of being an enemy combatant). As this is more of a sociological spectrum
rather than a legal spectrum, its coverage in this article will be limited to the gist of the Korematsu and
Padilla-Hamdi decisions, and their implications on the alienage jurisprudence.
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name of sovereignty. The plenary power doctrine immunizes all actions of the
political branches of government from any kind of judicial scrutiny.7  The
jurisprudence of aliens characterized by this almost absolute immunity developed
alongside a maturing rights-based jurisprudence. At times, they have crossed paths,
but have never been united.5  This separation remains awkward and contributes to
the insatiability and confusion in the alienage jurisprudence.9
This article takes a unique approach to this problem by employing a
spectrum-based analytical framework that examines the Bill of Rights of aliens by
dividing them into a spectrum of definable and jurisprudentially appropriate
categories.10 Predicated on this analytical framework, the article contends that the
disorder is a product of the exclusion of aliens from the benefits of maturing notions
11
of equal protection and due process that resulted from the Chinese exclusion case,
and forms part of the Plessy v. Ferguson legacy.12 Put differently, the article's
6. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). This case is commonly referred
to as the Chinese Exclusion case. Although Chae is the last name, throughout this article, the case will be
referenced as Ping or the Chinese Exclusion case more frequently used in the literature.
7. See Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
8. For scholarly commentary highlighting the divergences and occasional convergences see,
e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation oflmmigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. I (1984), reprinted in
I GABRIEL J. CHIN, VICTOR C. ROMERO & MICHAEL A. SCAPERLANDA, THE ORIGINS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: IMMIGRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 267, 284 (2001) ("[lt]he signs of incipient
change are abundant and unmistakable. The courts' almost complete deference to Congress and the
immigration authorities, long a keystone of the classical structure, is beginning to give way to a new
understanding and rhetoric of judicial role ... Immigration is gradually rejoining the mainstream of our
public law."); Alexander Aleinikoff, The United States Constitution in Its Third Century: Foreign Affairs:
Rights Here and There: Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 866
(1989) ("We have therefore ended the second century of the Constitution as we ended its first. The
descendants of Yick Wo and Wong Wing extend constitutional protections to aliens; yet they stand side
by side with the progeny of Chinese Exclusion and Fong Yue Ting, which leave federal regulation of
immigration virtually free from constitutional restrictions.").
9. Professor Hiroshi Motomura suggests that courts have over the ages attempted to mitigate
the harsh and unacceptable effects of the application of the plenary power by relying on what he calls
"phantom constitutional norms" rather than directly engaging constitutional issues. See Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After A Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990). Having noted the Supreme Court's avoidance of
the constitutional issue of race-based exclusion in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), Motomura
concludes that "[sitatutory interpretation confuses and contorts the law when the interpreting court relies
for an extended period on constitutional norms that are doctrinally 'improper' in the sense that they do not
control in cases which explicitly involve interpreting the Constitution. I suggest that the only way out of
the dilemma posed by the prolonged reign of phantom norm decision making in immigration law is to
bring the transitional phase to an end - in short, to undertake a direct and candid reassessment of plenary
power as constitutional doctrine." Id.
10. To the author's knowledge, no existing work addresses the alienage spectrum and the
disorder thereof in the same way as this work. The closest spectrum-based analytical work is Professor
David Martin's 2001 article in the University of Chicago's Supreme Court Review. See David A. Martin,
Graduated Application of Constitutional Protection for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 96-97 (2001). Professor Victor C. Romero has also conducted a spectrum-based
analysis in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but the nature, scope, and contexts of the inquiry are
quite distinct. See VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
EQUALITY IN AMERICA 82-84 (2005).
11. See Ping, 130 U.S. 581. Other important cases in this era include Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (holding that due process is whatever one immigration officer says it
is) and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding the requirement that only "a
credible white witness" may be presented as evidence of physical presence on specific dates to avoid
deportation).
12. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (interpreting equal protection as separate but
2010] 91
HeinOnline  -- 20 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 91 2010
BERKELEY LA RAz4 LAWJOURNAL
contention is that the source of the disorder is the century-old tug-of-war between the
plenary power doctrine,' 3  which immunizes congressional acts relating to
immigration from judicial review, and contemporary notions of due process and
equal protection.14 In other words, the disorder is a product of tension between the
perception of the Constitution as a compact between a selected group of people with
the prerogative to exclude all others, and the perception of the Constitution "as a
limitation on the Government's conduct with respect to all whom it seeks to
govern." 6  The interplay between these fundamental assumptions, coupled with
historical accidents, has produced a jurisprudence that is incoherent, unstable,
unpredictable, and inconsistent with contemporary understandings of the reach of the
17
Bill of Rights. The article further contends that the Guantanamo cases have
significantly contributed to the process of reunification of these two separate and
unequal allocations of rights by bringing aliens with the least qualitative and
quantitative contact with the United Sates within the realm of constitutional
protection. Based on this assessment, the article argues that the total reunification of
the alien-citizen based jurisprudential divide could be obtained by employing the
traditional ascending scale of a rights approach. That would require according aliens
who are better positioned on the spectrum superior rights to those enemy aliens who
are at the very beginning of the spectrum. Such a result cannot be meaningfully
achieved without overruling the original sources of the plenary power doctrine more
explicitly than what has been attempted in some modem cases, including the
Guantanamo cases. This article also proposes some simple and attainable legislative
measures that minimize the undesirable effects of the disordered spectrum, ensure
some level of stability, predictability and fairness, and recognize the fact that
enduring jurisprudential changes would require the right mix of circumstances that
occurs with time.
Part II defines the existing spectrum in light of the Supreme Court's
century-old jurisprudence and the immigration and nationality law, and highlights
equal).
13. The plenary doctrine found its rudimentary expression in 1889 in a case commonly known
as the Chinese Exclusion case. See Ping, 130 U.S. 581. While it is being continually challenged, its basic
premise continues to guide the jurisprudence of alienage.
14. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and the United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862 (1987) (noting the evolution of the
notions of due process and equal protection in the context of the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
Chinese Exclusion Era).
15. A very good representation of this perception is Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). For a detailed discussion of CJ. Rehnquist's
opinion in this case, see infra sec. (ll)(a)(i)(1).
16. See id. at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For a detailed discussion of this
tension, and Brennan's opinion see infra sec. (l1)(a)(i)(3). For a comprehensive treatment of this notion of
mutuality, see GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996).
17. It must be acknowledged at the outset that the spectrum analysis merges the alienage
jurisprudence that has developed in various contexts (e.g., admission/exclusion, indefinite detention,
unlawful searches and seizures, educational and public benefits, and associational and related rights) into a
unitary paradigm. Such merger, however, is appropriate and analytically useful because the fundamental
notion that aliens have no or reduced rights is not predicated on the types of benefits they seek or the
nature of freedom they pursue but is essentially due to the fact that they are aliens. Although the nature of
the claim seems to make a difference in many instances, the depth and breath of their rights depends not
on the nature of their claims but largely on their position on the alienage spectrum; in other words, on
what kind of aliens they are. This proposition is fully developed throughout this article.
92 [Vol. 20
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the factors that have had a disordering impact. Part III identifies and critically
analyzes the sources of the disorder by dividing the jurisprudence into various eras.
Part IV engages the philosophical dilemma and outlines the steps that need to be
taken to reorder the disordered spectrum and ensure the stability and predictability of
the jurisprudence relating to the Bill of Rights as applied to aliens. Part V provides a
brief conclusion.
II. THE SPECTRUM AND THE DISORDER
This part critically analyzes legislative and judicial sources to highlight the
general assumption that more ties to the United States entitle an alien to better rights.
It also sets the stage for Part III, which analyzes the constitutional jurisprudence
pertaining to the Bill of Rights of aliens and demonstrates the disorder in the
spectrum.
a. Aliens Outside the United States
The alienage spectrum begins with aliens who come in contact with United
States authorities in a foreign territory. While contact may occur in many ways, this
article classifies such contact into two categories: involuntary contacts, and voluntary
contacts. Each category is discussed below.
i. Involuntary Encounter
Various categories of aliens may involuntarily come in contact with the
United States authorities outside of the United States in ways that could test how the
Bill of Rights applies to them. Three categories of such aliens could be identified.
The first category is the "enemy alien" category.' 8 It is very difficult to imagine
aliens more alien than "enemy aliens" detained outside of the United States. Not
only are they aliens to the United States, but they are also its enemies. As will be
discussed below, courts have looked at the applicability of the Bill of Rights to these
aliens from a different perspective. As such, the discussion of the spectrum must
begin with this category of aliens. The remaining two categories, which are
discussed under the involuntary classification, include aliens detained by United
States authorities in foreign countries who are brought to the United States for
purposes of criminal prosecution, and aliens intercepted on the high seas while
attempting to enter United States territorial waters. The Bill of Rights jurisprudence
pertaining to each one of these three involuntary categories is discussed as follows.
1. Enemy Aliens Detained Outside the United States
The constitutional issues pertaining to the Bill of Rights of enemy aliens
often arise in connection with claims of access to the judiciary in the form of the writ
18. The term "enemy aliens" represents a law of war concept relating to the treatment of
nationals of an enemy state. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War art. 35, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (providing for some rights of these individuals).
As the following sections demonstrate, U.S. courts have used the concept in a variety of ways; however, it
is used in this article only for its suggestion that the persons are both alien to the United States and are
perceived to be enemies of the United States without going too much into the exact meaning under the law
of war or international humanitarian law in general.
932010]
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of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence pertaining to this issue, which
spans more than a century, is too broad to be covered here; however, a discussion of
the implications of the most significant cases to the spectrum analysis is provided
here.
One of the Supreme Court's most important post-World War II opinions,
defining the rights of enemy aliens, particularly combatants, outside the United
19
States, is Johnson v. Eisentrager. In Eisentrager, a group of twenty-one German
nationals petitioned the District Court for the District of Columbia for writ of habeas
corpus challenging the legality of their imprisonment. They were captured in China
by the U.S. military, tried by a U.S. Military Commission sitting in China, and
imprisoned in U.S. controlled territory in Germany.20 The District Court rejected
their petition on the grounds that the aliens had no contact with the United States
except their capture and trial by U.S. military in a foreign country.21 The Appeals
Court reversed on the grounds that:
[A]ny person including an enemy alien, deprived of his liberty
anywhere under any purported authority of the United States is
entitled to the writ if he can show that extension to his cases of any
constitutional rights or limitations would show his imprisonment
illegal; that, although no statutory jurisdiction of such cases is
given, courts must be held to possess it as part of the judicial
power of the United States; that where deprivation of liberty by an
official act occurs outside the territorial jurisdiction of any District
Court, the petition will lie in the District Court which has territorial
jurisdiction over officials who have directive power over the
22
immediate jailer.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court stressed the importance of the distinction
between citizens and aliens: "Citizenship as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of
protection was old when Paul invoked it in his appeal to Caesar., 23 The Court
added: "The years have not diminished the importance of citizenship nor have they
sapped the validity of a citizen's claim upon his government for protection." 24 It
further noted that even aliens are not a homogenous group. Some are friendly aliens,
some are enemy aliens, some are enemy combatants, and others are resident aliens.
Therefore, not all aliens warrant the same levels of constitutional protection.25 The
Court then put the classic spectrum argument in these terms:
The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally
hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of
rights as he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful
19. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
20. Id. at 765-67.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 767 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 769. Unimpressed with the majority's Paul-Caesar relationship as an indication of
the importance of citizenship, the dissent points to Rome's treatment of Paul himself and the other
disciples. Id. at 798.
24. Id. at 769. The Court added that "[it is neither sentimentality nor chauvinism to repeat
that 'Citizenship is a high privilege."' Id. at 770.
25. Id. at 767.
94 [Vol. 20
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presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe
conduct and gives him certain rights; they become more expansive
and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to
become a citizen and they expand to those of full citizenship upon
naturalization. During his probationary residence, this Court has
steadily enlarged his right against Executive deportation except
upon full and fair hearing.
The Court's decision rested on the argument that, while the Constitution
follows citizens wherever they may go, aliens would need some connection with the
territory of the United States to claim protection under the Bill of Rights.27 In
rejecting the claims in this case, the Court observed that for purposes of
constitutional protection, enemy combatants in a foreign territory receive the least
28,2
protection. The Court gave the 21 German petitioners six "alienage points.
These points include: (1) being enemy aliens who took part in combat, (2) not having
a claim of residence or contact with any territory over which United States
sovereignty extends, (3) being captured in foreign land and kept there as prisoners of
war, (4) being tried and convicted by a military commission sitting in a foreign
country, (5) committing serious offenses, i.e., war crimes outside of the U.S., and
finally, (6) being imprisoned outside of the United States at all times.30
Conversely, the key issue for the dissent was the very foundation of the
principle of separation of powers and the role of the judiciary in the tripartite
constitutional order. The ascending scale of the rights of aliens was not as important.
More specifically, dissenting Justices Black, Douglas, and Burton framed the issue
as: "whether the judiciary has power in habeas corpus proceedings to test the legality
of criminal sentences imposed by the executive in a country which we have occupied
for years."3 1 In answering this question in the affirmative, they provided this
compelling point:
[c]itizenship is enriched beyond price by our goal of equal justice
under law-equal justice not for citizens alone, but for all persons
coming within the ambit of our power. This ideal gave birth to the
constitutional provision for an independent judiciary with authority
32
to check abuses of executive power .... .
For the majority, it was about how many rights the alien should be given on
an ascending scale. However, for the dissent it was about the very foundation of the
constitutional order, and more specifically, it was about the role of the judiciary to
26. Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added). The Court cites numerous immigration cases, some of
which will be discussed in subsequent sections in some detail, including: Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86
(1903) (Japanese Immigrant Case); United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924); United States
ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Id.
27. Id. at 778.
28. Id.
29. The Court did not use the term "alienage points," but it is used in this article for purposes
of demonstrating the spectrum.
30. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777-78.
31. See id. at 797.
32. Id.at791.
2010] 95
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check abuses of power by the political branches.33 The majority in Eisentrager, just
like in Ping, reasoned that the judiciary must stay out of the decisions of the political
branches, at least as it relates to enemy aliens in a foreign land. The same issue was
tested again more than half a century later in connection with the "War on Terror."
The first and principal case that reexamined these issues was Rasul v.
Bush.34 In Rasul, two Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens who were held
at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba after being captured in
Afghanistan during the U.S. armed conflict with the Taliban, challenged their
detention a writ of habeas corpus filed in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. The main issue in this case was whether federal courts have jurisdiction
to consider the legality of detention of aliens captured in a foreign country and
incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay. Justice Stevens writing for the Court answered
this question in the affirmative by distinguishing Eisentrager.37 The Court began its
opinion by addressing the very nature of habeas corpus and its historical roots. It
quoted section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized the issuance of
habeas corpus to prisoners who are "in custody, under or by colour of the authorit
of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same."
The historical review continues by highlighting that the 1867 Congress extended the
right of habeas corpus to "all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States."39
Although Rasul attempted to characterize the writ as a check against the exercise of
authority, it did not go so far as to endorse the dissent in Eisentrager, which
suggested that every time the United States exercises authority abroad, all aliens
subjected to its authority may have access to federal courts.40 Instead, the Court
chose to distinguish Eisentrager on a number of different levels.
Most notably, the Court analyzed the six alienage points discussed above
and said that the Rasul detainees, unlike Eisentrager, were not nationals of a country
at war with the United States.41 The Court also disputed any allegation that they took
part in hostilities, had no access to any process, that their detention was lengthy and
conceivably indefinite, and finally, that they were detained in a "territory over which
the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control."42 The Court used all
these factors to diminish the alienage of the petitioners by giving them "citizen
33. The debate in this area is part of the larger and enduring issue of judicial philosophy with
wider and more serious consequences than the relatively smaller issue of alienage jurisprudence. A large
amount of literature deals with the issue ofjudicial philosophy. This is a debate that seems to renew every
time a new justice is nominated for the Supreme Court. For a good summary of contemporary notions of
judicial philosophy, see Jeffrey Rosen, Whats a Liberal Justice Now? N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2009, at
MM50, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/31/magazine/31court-t.html?ref=politics.
34. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
35. Id. at 470-71.
36. Id. at 470.
37. Although the majority of the Court did not say that it overruled Eisentrager, Justice Scalia
makes a compelling argument that the Court did indeed overrule Eisentrager. See id. at 476-78, 97-98.
38. Id. at 473 (citing Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, sec. 14, I Stat. 82).
39. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385) (emphasis added).
40. Justice Scalia reads this into the opinion. See id. at 498 ("The consequence of this
holding, as applied to aliens outside the country, is breathtaking. It permits an alien captured in a foreign
theater of active combat to bring a sec. 2241 petition against the Secretary of Defense.").
41. They were Australian and Kuwaiti. See id. at 470-71.
42. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476.
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points" and bringing them within the ambit of the Constitution. In that light, the
Court's argument is effectively a spectrum or ascending scale of right argument.
Although the basis of the decision was the several distinguishing factors noted
above, the Court insinuated that Eisentrager's underlying statutory rationale had
already been overruled by prior cases in order to avoid the criticism that it was
overruling Eisentrager without justification.43 Finally, in answering the long-
standing presumption that congressional acts do not apply extraterritorially, the
Court established that "considering that the statute draws no distinction between
Americans and aliens held in federal custody, there is little reason to think that
Congress intended the eographical coverage of the statute to vary depending on the
detainee's citizenship."
Unimpressed with the majority's argument about Eisentrager being
undermined by earlier cases, Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion in
the decision. He subscribed to the classic spectrum argument made by the majority
of the Court, noting its "ascending scale of rights" approach. He further noted that
citizenship provides a longstanding basis for jurisdiction, and that among aliens
physical presence within the United States also "gave the Judiciary power to act."4
With respect to the specific issue at hand, he noted that Guantanamo Bay is not
China or Germany and that it is far removed from hostilities. He concluded that on
these bases alone, Eisentrager must be distinguished.46
Justice Scalia, with Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist concurring,
did not quarrel with the idea of an ascending scale of rights; however, he did not
think that the Rasul petitioners had better contacts with the United States than the
Eisentrager petitioners.47 In other words, for Justice Scalia, Rasul was as much an
alien as Eisentrager. For him, the Court blatantly overruled Eisentrager without
48
having valid grounds to do so. In his own words:
The Court today holds that the habeas statute.. .extends to aliens
detained by the United States military overseas, outside the
sovereign borders of the United States and beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of all its courts. This is not only a novel holding; it
contradicts a half-century-old precedent on which the military
undoubtedly relied.49
If one takes Justice Scalia's words, Eisentrager is overruled and enemy aliens
detained by the authority of the United States perhaps anywhere may challenge their
detention through habeas corpus. This characterization seems to make it all about
the exercise of authority and the checking of abuse, and not about the alien's location
or status. Yet a careful reading of the Court's opinion does not support Justice
43. Although the Court included a lengthy discussion of these prior cases to support the
conclusion that Eisentrager was already undermined, later cases would resurrect the debate. Id. at 476-78
(citing Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, (1948); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484,
495 (1973)).
44. See Rasul, 542 U.S at 481.
45. See id. at 486.
46. See id. at 487.
47. See id at 488-89.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 488.
50. See id. at 506 (citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)). Justice Scalia considers
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Scalia's characterization. As subsequent cases, discussed below, make clear, Justice
Scalia himself would refrain from making such a broad generalization about Rasul.
In Rasul, the Supreme Court made it clear that even suspected enemy aliens
detained at Guantanamo Bay must be given an opportunity to contest the legality of
their detention. However, the specific nature of the due process that they must
receive became a subject of great controversy later. The first of the man cases that
considered the nature of mandated due process was Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. Hamdan
tested the constitutional validity of a military commission set up to try some of the
Guantanamo detainees. The petitioner, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who was alleged to
have served as Osama Bin Laden's driver, was brought before a military commission
set up by a presidential order.52 Although this case involved numerous peripheral,
complicated jurisdictional and separation of powers issues, Hamdan's principal
challenge was twofold: (1) he was accused of a crime that does not exist under the
Uniform Code of Military Conduct or the Geneva Conventions,5 3 and (2) the military
54
commission's procedures denied him due process. On the substantive charges, the
Court noted that the charging document had thirteen numbered paragraphs, eleven of
which merely described the President's authority and Bin Laden's activities without
even mentioning Hamdan. The remaining two paragraphs alleged that Hamdan
55
conspired to commit violations of the laws of war by driving Bin Laden around.
Utterly unimpressed with the legal theory behind these allegations and the manner of
their presentation, the Court's view was that even if conspiracies to commit
violations of the laws of war are said to be crimes without any conduct in furtherance
of them, these are not the types of crimes that must be tried by a military commission
56
with defective procedural foundations.
Perhaps a more important aspect to the case was the procedural controversy
it presented. The military commission allowed, among other things, the admissibility
of hearsay evidence and also evidence obtained possibly through torture. Moreover,
the commission's rules denied the accused, as well as his attorney, access to
classified evidence that could be used for his conviction.57 The Court did not find
the government's war-exigencies argument of dispensing with fundamental
guarantees of due process convincing. In particular, the Court agreed that there was
no valid reason why military court-marshal process could not be used.58 The Court
further ruled that the commission violated the Geneva Conventions, and in particular
common article 3, which requires trial by "a regularly constituted court affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people." 59
it ironic that a citizen detained in a particular U.S. District must bring his action within that District per
Padilla, yet an alien detained outside of the United States may choose from among the ninety-four
Districts. Clearly, in an effort to suggest absurdity, Justice Scalia stretches the Court's ruling in Rasul. See
id.
51. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
52. See id. at 566-67.
53. The main charge was conspiracy to commit violations of the laws of war. See id. at 567.
54. See id. at 567.
55. See id. at 569-70.
56. See id. at 612.
57. See id. at 614 (citing various subsections of sections 6 (B) and (D) of the Presidential
Order called the November Order or Commission Order No. 1).
58. See id. at 622-23.
59. See id. at. 631-32.
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In its conclusion, the Court found that:
... it bears emphasizing that Hamdan does not challenge, and we
do not today address, the Government's power to detain him for
the duration of active hostilities in order to prevent such harm. But
in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal
punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of
Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.60
This was a case that tested the limits of the Court's tolerance in dispensing with
fundamental guarantees of due process because of the place of the alien in the
aliena e spectrum. Unfortunately, Rasul, Hamdan, and the other Guantanamo Bay
cases did not resolve all the constitutional issues relating to the rights of enemy
aliens detained outside of United States territory. Most importantly, none of these
cases directly answered the essential question of whether detained enemy aliens have
the constitutional right of habeas corpus as opposed to the statutory right of habeas
corpus, and whether it may be suspended without conformance with the Suspension
Clause.62 The Court answered this important question in Boumediene v. Bush.
The Boumediene petitioners alleged that their right to habeas corpus was
denied in violation of the Suspension Clause in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)
and the Military Commission Act (MCA).64 The Court categorically declared that
the procedures contained in these Acts unconstitutionally sus ended habeas corpus
by failing to provide an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.
Before the Court's reasoning is discussed, it is important to note the
evolution of the issue in the context of the detention of the alleged enemy aliens in
Guantanamo. As indicated above, Rasul held that enemy aliens detained in
Guantanamo Bay have a statutory right to contest the legality of their detention by
habeas corpus. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, was decided the same day as Rasul. In Hamdi,
the Court also determined that a United States citizen detained at Guantanamo on
allegation of being an enemy combatant has the right to "notice of the factual basis
for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decision maker."67  Relating to the adequacy of any
supposed process, the plurality of the Court suggested that "an appropriately
authorized and properly constituted military tribunal" might be sufficient. The
DTA .was supposed to be the two political branches' response to the Court's
69
persistent demand for a meaningful process. The DTA set up a two-step process:
60. Id. at 635.
61. These two cases are discussed in some detail later in this section. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (ruling that a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant be given a reasonable
opportunity to contest his designation before an neutral decision maker); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct.
2711 (limiting habeas jurisdiction to the district of confinement).
62. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
63. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
64. See id. at 2240 (citing The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), 119 Stat. 2739; The
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C.A., sec. 2241(e) (Supp. 2007)).
65. See id. at 2240.
66. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
67. Id. at 533.
68. Id. at 538.
69. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241.
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first, the detainee would appear before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT)
to have his combatant status determined. Second, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
would conduct a review to determine whether the CSRT proceedings were consistent
with "the Constitution and laws of the United States."70 Before the Court addressed
the specific issues relating to the adequacy of the process the DTA put in place, it
categorically dismissed the government's proposition that aliens detained in
Guantanamo Bay are not entitled to constitutional habeas corpus. Once again, as in
Rasul, the Court recited the rich history of the writ in the Anglo-American system as
a check against tyranny.72 In relation to this overarching separation of powers issue,
it added the following extremely impactful paragraph, which may have immense
consequences in the immigration context:
Abstaining from questions involving formal sovereignty and
territorial governance is one thing. To hold the political branches
have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will is quite
another. The former position reflects this Court's recognition that
certain matters requiring political judgments are best left to the
political branches. The latter would permit a striking anomaly in
our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which
Congress and the President, not this Court, say 'what the law is.' 73
To reaffirm its Rasul decision this way, the Court had to confront Eisentrager once
again. As Justice Scalia properly notes in his dissent, which is discussed here later,
the Court reduced Eisentrager's six "alienage" factors into a "functional test," 74 and
distinguished the Boumediene facts from the Eisentrager facts.7 5  In particular,
predicated on the Eisentrager alienage factors, it identified the three most important
factors for the determination of the reach of the Suspension Clause: "(1) the
citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which
that status determination is made; (2) the nature of the sites where the apprehension
and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving
the prisoner's entitlement to the writ."
With respect to the first factor, the Court made several important
distinctions as they related to Boumediene and Eisentrager. The court outlined the
issues of uncertainty surrounding the status of the Boumediene petitioners as to
whether they were considered enemy combatants or not, and whether the absence of
a military trial or any kind of trial for six years, including the lack of representation,
70. See id.
71. See id. at 2244.
72. See id. at 2244-52 (using two cases in support of its separation of powers argument
including, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59
(1983)). Although the Court held that the Constitution applies to enemy aliens detained in a foreign
territory, in specifically limiting the reach of this ruling to Guantanamo, it introduced this idea of de jure
sovereignty, which made the application of the constitution possible. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2253.
The court, however, noted that "[e]ven when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not
'absolute and unlimited' but are subject 'to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution."' Id. at.
2259 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)).
73. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177, 2
L. Ed. 60 (1803)) (emphasis added).
74. See id. at 2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 2259.
76. Id.
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was appropriate.77 In relation to the second factor, the Court explained the special
circumstances of Guantanamo Bay as a U.S. controlled territory to which de facto
sovereignty extends. In the third factor, the Court noted that the United States does
not face the kind of threat that it did during the Eisentrager era and, as such, the due
process accorded to the Guantanamo detainees must be looked at in that light.79
Having noted these distinctions, the Court concluded by stating, "Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 of
the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus
is to be denied to the detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance with
the requirements of the Suspension Clause."80
Having firmly established the applicability of the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution to Guantanamo Bay, the Court went on to discuss the two fundamental
flaws that rendered the DTA process an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus, and,
as such, an unlawful suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. While the first pertains
to the fairness of the first instance proceeding, the second pertains to restrictions on
judicial review. As each one of these factors has profound implications on the status
of aliens in the immigration context, they are discussed below in some detail.
With respect to the CSRT process that the DTA set up, the Court noted
numerous infirmities. These infirmities include the detainees' inability to find and
present evidence to rebut the Government's allegations, lack of assistance of counsel
the use of confidential evidence, and the admissibility of hearsay evidence.
According to the Court, these factors made the process constitutionally deficient. It
is important to note here that immigration removal proceedings are characterized by
all of these factors that the Court now cites as examples of constitutional infirmities
of the CSRT process.
Perhaps more importantly, the Court carefully evaluated the nature of the
purported judicial review of the CSRT proceedings. It began by saying that for
judicial review to be meaningful, courts must have "the means to correct errors that
occur" at the trial level.82 More specifically it noted that this would include "some
authority to assess the sufficiency of the Government's evidence against the
detainee. It also must have authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory
evidence that was not introduced during the earlier proceeding." 83 According to the
Court, the problem with the DTA's judicial review provision is that it does not allow
the Court of Appeals "to make requisite findings of fact." 84  The DTA's
authorization is limited to the review of whether the CSRT followed the "standards
and procedures." These standards include "the requirement that the conclusion of
the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence ... allowing a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence." 86 Apart from this,
the Court also noted the absence of a provision authorizing the Appellate Court to
77. See id. at 2259-60.
78. Id. at 2259-60 ("But there are critical differences between Landsberg Prison, circa 1950,
and the United States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bayjn 2008.").
79. See id. at 2261.
80. Id. at 2262.
81. See id. at 2269.
82. See id. at 2270.
83. Id. at 2270.
84. Id. at 2272.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 2272 (citing DTA sec. 1005(e)(C)).
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order the release of the detainees when necessary as evidence of a great
constitutional infirmity. The Court mentioned its profound discomfort with the
provisions of the DTA that seem to attempt to shield the factual findings of the
CSRT from judicial review. Ironically, the judicial review provisions of the INA
are exactly the same as the judicial review provisions of the DTA that the Court
rejected in this case. This point will be explored further in subsequent sections.
For Justice Scalia, this was a historic departure from established precedent.
He began his dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Thomas and Alito, by declaring: "Today, for the first time in our Nation's history,
the Court confers a constitutional right to habeas corpus on alien enemies detained
abroad by our military forces in the course of an ongoing war."89 Scalia ends his
opinion by determining that the Court's extension of the right to habeas corpus to
90
enemy aliens in a foreign land is "ultra vires."
For the dissent, particularly Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts,
Boumediene overrule important precedent, but they differ in the importance they
attach to said precedent. Justice Scalia is more worried about the possible silent
overruling of Eisentrager, and Chief Justice Roberts is more worried about the
possible silent overruling of Hamdi v. Bush.91 The petitioner in Hamdi was a U.S.
citizen held at Guantanamo on allegations of being an enemy combatant; however,
Chief Justice Roberts contends that the Court's demand was limited to the right to
"notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision maker."92 Further, Roberts
points out that in Hamdi, the Court deemed a trial "b an appropriately authorized
and properly constituted military tribunal" sufficient. This may strike Roberts as
ironical where such limited process, which includes the admissibility of hearsay and
a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government,94 is deemed sufficient for a
U.S. citizen, but not sufficient for enemy aliens. For Roberts, the determinative
factor is the distinction between citizens and aliens. He categorically finds that "the
Due Process Clause does not afford non-citizens in such circumstances greater
protection than citizens." 95 Again, for Roberts the "evidentiary and other limitations
the Court complained about reflect the nature of the issue in contest, namely, the
status of aliens captured by our Armed Forces abroad and alleged to be enemy
combatants."96 As such, a review of their rights "need not parallel the habeas
privileges enjoyed by noncombatant American citizens[;] ... [i]t need only provide
process adequate for non-citizens detained as alleged combatants."9 7
87. See id. at 2272-73.
88. See id. at 2273-74.
89. Id. at 2293-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 2294.
91. Id. at 2280-89 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)).
92. See id. at 2281.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 2281-83, 2288 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533 ("hearsay, for example, may need
to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government.")).
95. See id. at 2281, 2283. Roberts also relies on Mathews v. Eldridge, to support the argument
that the circumstances warrant a limited process, and that the Mathews balancing test may be satisfied.
See Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
96. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2287.
97. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241 (200 ed. and Supp. V)).
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In defending the DTA's judicial review provisions, Chief Justice Roberts
relied on similar provisions upheld in the immigration context. He accurately noted
that "[i]n [immigration cases], other than the question whether there was some
evidence to support the [deportation] order, the courts generally did not review
factual determinations made by the Executive." 9 Roberts' argument that judicial
review provisions of the DTA mirror that of the immigration laws is remarkable and
accurate, particularly after the enactment of the Real ID Act of 2005, which
overruled St. Cyr. 00 Although St. Cyr supports the proposition that Roberts cites it
for, (i.e., the Court's lack of inquiry into factual determinations) its importance is
linked to the Court's reiteration of the need for express congressional language for
the repeal of statutory habeas claim. 01 The Real ID Act categorically eliminated all
writs, habeas and mandamus. The pertinent provision under the title "exclusive
means of review" states:
Notwithstanding any provision of law (statutory or non-statutory),
including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code or any other
habeas corpus -provision.. .a petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall
be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of
removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act.102
The impact of this provision is exactly the same as the DTA provision the Court
rejected in Boumediene as an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus because of two
fundamental reasons: 1) the review by the Courts of Appeals is limited to
constitutional and other questions of law; and 2) the reviewing court would not get
an opportunity to correct any flawed factual findings.104 Another fact that the Court
found objectionable in the DTA is the admissibility of hearsay and confidential
evidence. In the immigration context, by contrast, both are admissible. 0 5  This is
precisely what Chief Justice Roberts considers ironic given the position of the
"enemy aliens" in the alienage spectrum. In other words, Roberts' objection is
98. See id. at 2286 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306 (2001)).
99. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 115 Stat. 231 (2005) (enacting INA sec. 242(a)(2)(D)).
100. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306; see also, Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953) (noting
"[i]n military habeas corpus the inquiry, the scope of matters open for review, has always been more
narrow than civil cases").
101. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 311.
102. INA, sec. 242(b)(5).
103. See INA sec. 242(a)(2(D) ("Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other
provision of this Act (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed
as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.").
104. See, e.g., Hamid v. Gonzalez, 417 F. 2d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
immigration judges' conclusions of fact in denying relief are not reviewable as the dispute is purely
factual). See also Conteh v. Gonzalez, 461 F. 3d 45, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that after the Real ID
Act, an Appeals Court has no authority to conduct a substantial evidence review).
105. See 8. C.F.R. Sec. 1240.7(a) ("Any oral or written statement which is material and
relevant to any issue in the case previously made by the respondent or any other person during any
investigation, examination, hearing or trial."); see Espinoza v. I.N.S., 45 F. 3d 308, 310-11 (9th Cir.
1995); accord, Doumbia v. Gonzales, 472 F. 3d 957, 962-63 (7th Cir. 2007). But see Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004) ("[W]here testimonial statements are at issue, only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes, i.e.,
confrontation.").
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absolutely accurate in that Boumediene would give better due process rights to
enemy aliens detained in Guantanamo than ordinary aliens fighting deportation from
the United States. As such, it could be concluded that Boumediene does indeed
disorder the alienage spectrum by giving to enemy aliens detained at Guantanamo
better rights than to ordinary aliens in deportation proceedingsto in the United
States, and perhaps to U.S. citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay. However, as
subsequent sections elaborate, the solution to this problem is not denying the
Guantanamo detainees due process rights just because immigrants in the U.S. do not
have the same rights, as Roberts suggests, but instead, extending the same kinds of
due process rights to immigrants.
2. Interception on the High Seas, Detention and Return
Aliens intercepted on the high seas could rightfully be placed towards the
beginning of the alienage spectrum because they have not set foot on U.S. soil. The
Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian Center Councils examined the claim of rights by
aliens in this category.1 0 8 In Sale, several Haitian refugees challenged a presidential
decree that authorized the Coast Guard to intercept Haitian boatpeople on the high
seas and return them to Haiti, where their life or freedom would be threatened.
The essential question presented was whether the aliens intercepted per such decree
could avail themselves of a Congressional Act which granted aliens the right not to
be returned to a place where their "life or freedom would be threatened." 1 0
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens began his analysis by making a
spectrum argument. He noted that the principle of non-refoulement, i.e., non-return,
is mandatory as long as the alien can show that there is a clear possibility that his life
or freedom would be threatened. II The question was, however, if aliens who were
actively prevented from reaching the U.S. territory could claim this protection. In
answering this question he emphasized the distinction that Congress and the courts
have long made between aliens who seek admission on the border in exclusion
112
proceedings, and those who fight deportation after having been admitted. To set
the stage for his spectrum argument, he finds that those in exclusion proceedinhs
have always received less due process than those in deportation proceedings.
Relying on 1950s precedent, Stevens further noted that just because an alien is
106. See INA sec. 242(a)(2) (Real ID) (limiting judicial review by the appeals courts to
questions of law and constitutional claims only)
107. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
108. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
109. See id. at 158-59.
110. See id. at 158-59. The relevant Congressional Act is the 1980 Refugee Act, Pub. L. N.
96-212, 94 stat. 107 (1980). It makes up a part of the INA (8 of U.S.C.). Congress enacted the Refugee
Act to bring the U.S. into compliance with the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
of 1967. See 509 U.S. at 170 (citing I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37. (1987) (mandating
the non-return of refugees to places where they may be persecuted); see INA sec. 208 & sec. 241(b)(3).
111. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 159-60. The old INA provision at issue in Sale was sec. 243(h)(1).
It is now sec. 241(b)(3)(A) and it provides that, "[tihe Attorney General may not remove an alien to a
country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." See also I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 423 (1984).
112. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 159.
113. See id. at 159-60, 175-76 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 212 (1953)); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)).
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physically in the U.S. does not mean that he is "within the United States" within the
meaning of the statute. In other words, a person who is temporarily paroled into the
country is not considered "within the United States" for purposes of procedural due
process.'14 More importantly, Justice Stevens reiterated that in the absence of
express authorization, Acts of Congress are presumed to have no extraterritorial
application, and that Congress expressed no such intent in enacting the provision
under consideration. Based on these reasons, Justice Stevens concluded that
Haitian refugees fleeing undisputed persecution 17 might be forcibly returned to Haiti
as long as the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted them before they could reach U.S.
territory.' 8
In other words, aliens who have not reached U.S. territory are not entitled to
the claim of any benefits under the immigration laws even when the U.S. actively
sought to prevent them from reaching its shores and return them to the place where
they would face persecution. Justice Stevens' concluding paragraph is perhaps more
telling than everything he said in this case. He quoted a concurring opinion by a
Circuit Court Judge: "This case presents a painfully common situation in which
desperate people, convinced that they can no longer remain in their homeland, take
desperate measures to escape. Although the human crisis is compelling, there is no
solution to be found in a judicial remedy."" 9  This is, of course, a classic Ping
plenary power argument; otherwise it could not have passed the Court's "shocks the
conscience" test, let alone any kind of due process analysis. The last paragraph of
the Court's opinion established that even if gathering refugees fleeing for safety from
the high seas and returning them to their persecutors violates the spirit of the law,'20
114. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 174-5 (citing among others Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185,
186 (1958); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1956); Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953)). ("Under the INA, both then and now, those seeking 'admission' and
trying to avoid 'exclusion' were already within our territory (or at its border), but the law treated them as
though they had never entered the United States at all; they were within United States territory but not
'within the United States.' Those who had been admitted (or found their way in) but sought to avoid
'expulsion' had the added benefit of 'deportation proceedings;' they were both within the United States
territory and 'within the United States.' Although the phrase 'within the United States' presumed the
alien's actual presence in the United States, it had more to do with an alien's legal status than with his
location.").
115. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 173 (citing among other cases, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 585-89 (1992)).
116. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 176, 188 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936)).
117. See id. at 162 ("As the District Court stated in an uncontested finding of fact, since the
military coup 'hundreds of Haitians have been killed, tortured, detained without a warrant, or subjected to
violence and destruction of their property because of their political beliefs. Thousands have been forced
into hiding."').
118. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 188. In defining the scope of the territory, successive
administrations followed what is known as "wet foot/dry foot" policy. See Office of Legal Counsel,
Department of Justice, Immigration Consequences of Undocumented Aliens Arrival in the United States
Territorial Waters (1993) cited in IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK, 435
(1 Ith ed. 2008).
119. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 188.
120. Justice Stevens surprisingly admits that much. See id. at 183 ("The drafters of the
Convention and the parties to the Protocol-like the drafters of § 243(h)-may not have contemplated that
any nation would gather fleeing refugees and return them to the one country they had desperately sought
to escape; such actions may even violate the spirit of Article 33; but a treaty cannot impose
uncontemplated extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it through no more than its general
humanitarian intent. Because the text of Article 33 cannot reasonably be read to say anything at all about
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courts must not second guess the wisdom of laws enacted by Congress as long as
they merely affect aliens who were collected from the high seas because their
relationship with the United States is limited to their encounter with the Coast Guard
on the high seas.
3. Arrest in a Foreign Country and Detention in the United
States on Criminal Charges
The legal quandary relating to the applicability of the Bill of Rights vis-A-
vis aliens detained by U.S. authorities outside of the United States for law
121
enforcement purposes is demonstrated by the Verdugo-Urquidez case. The
Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the
search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident
alien and located in a foreign country."' 22 The Court begins by holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply in such circumstances. The Court's plurality
opinion, as per Chief Justice Rehnquist, was principally focused on the alienage
spectrum. Specifically, the Court opined that the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to aliens depends on where the particular alien is on the spectrum,
although it did not use the term "spectrum." 24 It is clear from the Court's opinion
that Verdugo-Urquidez falls towards the very beginning of that spectrum.
Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican national, was suspected of serious drug
trafficking offenses. U.S. federal agents had an arrest warrant, and they arrested him
in Mexico City with the help of Mexican authorities; afterwards, they brought him to
the U.S. and charged him with several offenses.125 At trial, the prosecutors pumorted
to use evidence seized without a warrant from his Mexico City residence. He
moved to exclude the evidence on grounds of violation of his Fourth Amendment
right against unlawful searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit agreed with him, but the Supreme Court reversed.' 27
The Court agreed with the dissenting opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which relied on United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, a case
holding that "[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have
any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens."128 Although the
Court could have disposed of the case by simply relying on Curtiss- Wright, it chose
to reject this simplistic and categorical approach and rendered a more nuanced
opinion. By so doing, the Court tremendously complicated the already complex
jurisprudence relating to the applicability of the Bill of Rights to aliens. First, the
Court tried very hard to assign different meanings to the term "persons" as used in
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and "the people" as used in
a nation's actions toward aliens outside its own territory, it does not prohibit such actions.") (emphasis
added).
121. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
122. Id. at 261.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 274-75.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 261-64.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 264 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936) (understanding the Constitution as a compact among "the people" of the United States)).
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the Preamble, and the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.' 29
Having engaged in some historical inquest, the Court concluded that:
The available historical data show[s], therefore, that the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United
States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was
never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the
actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the
United States territory.1 30
The Court did not, however, say that no alien may be a part of the people. Some
aliens may be considered "the people," but others may not. Verdugo-Urquidez is
just a person, not part of "the people" because he lacked a "voluntary attachment"1 3'
and "a substantial connection"' 3 2 with the United States. In reaching this decision,
one of the greatest hurdles that Chief Justice Rehnquist faced hailed from an
unexpected corner: Chinese exclusion era cases. Yick Wo v. Hopkins upheld aliens'
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment,'3 3 and Wong Wing v.
United States upheld aliens' claims for protection under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.1 34 Rehnquist distinguished these cases in that the aliens involved had
voluntary and substantial connections with the United States.
No written opinion or legal text so clearly expresses the problem with the
Court's decision, and the entire doctrinal quandary relating to the applicability, or the
lack thereof, of the Bill of Rights vis-i-vis aliens as Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion does in this case. It reads in part:
According to the majority, the term "the people" refers to "a class
of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community." The Court admits that "the
people" extends beyond the citizenry, but leaves the precise
contours of its "sufficient connection" test unclear. At one point
the majority hints that aliens are protected by the Fourth
Amendment only when they come within the United States and
develop "substantial connections" with our country. At other
junctures, the Court suggests that an alien's presence in the United
States must be voluntary and that the alien must have "accepted
some societal obligations." At yet other points, the majority
implies that respondent would be protected by the Fourth
Amendment if the place searched were in the United States.
Unfortunately, the contours of the "sufficient connections" remained forever
undefined, which significantly contributed to the disorder in the alienage spectrum,
which of course predates this case.
129. See id. at 263-65.
130. Id. at 266.
131. Id. at 275.
132. Id. at 271.
133. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (cited in id. at 271).
134. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (cited in id. at 271).
135. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 282-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting, had no confusion about the
applicability of the Bill of Rights. To them, the Bill of Rights "did not purport to
'create' rights." Rather, the Framers "designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our
Government from infringing rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing."l 36 As
such, "bestowing rights and delineating protected groups would have been
inconsistent with the Drafters' fundamental conception of a Bill of Rights as a
limitation on the Government's conduct with respect to all whom it seeks to
,,137govern.
The dissenting justices were not impressed with the "person-people"
dichotomy. At a minimum, they did not think the historical evidence supported that
conclusion. In fact, they thought the historical evidence supported the contrary by
noting that the Constitutional Convention specifically rejected a recommended
amendment that would have limited the Fourth Amendment to "every freeman."' 3 8
Justice Brennan went on to articulate a compelling line of reasoning:
By concluding that respondent is not one of "the people" protected
by the Fourth Amendment, the majority disregards basic notions of
mutuality. If we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be
able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we
investigate, prosecute, and punish them. We have recognized this
fundamental principle of mutuality since the time of the
Framers. 139
For this proposition, he sought support from James Madison, who he said was
"universally recognized as the primary architect of the Bill of Rights," and who
"emphasized the importance of mutuality when he spoke out against the Alien and
Sedition Acts less than a decade after the adoption of the Fourth Amendment."
Madison's statement reads:
[I]t does not follow, because aliens are not parties to the
Constitution, as citizens are parties to it, that, whilst they actually
conform to it, they have no right to its protection. Aliens are no
more parties to the laws than they are parties to the Constitution;
yet it will not be disputed that, as they owe, on one hand, a
temporary obedience, they are entitled, in return, to their protection
and advantage.1 4 0
The plurality of the Court obviously did not adopt this notion of mutuality and the
applicability of the Bill of Rights to aliens, but rather chose the alienage spectrum
option, the contours of which it failed to define.
Finally, the Court deliberately left open the question of the role of illegal
presence in the determination of the alien's position in the spectrum although it
recognized that its previous Fourth Amendment decision involving aliens, Lopez-
136. Id. at 288.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id. (citing W. CUDDIHY, SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICAN
COLONIES, pt. 2, p. 571, n. 134 (1974)).
139. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284-85 (citing Madison's Report on the Virginia
Resolutions (1800), reprinted in 4 Elliot's Debates 556 (2d ed. 1836)).
140. Id.
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Mendoza,'41 suggested that the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment is limited to
deportation proceedings not criminal trials. 42 Although the Court's temptation to
overrule that precedent is clear from the opinion, it did not do so. As a result, it is
now unclear whether illegal presence, albeit for a long time, may provide the
requisite voluntary and substantial association to trigger the application of the Fourth
Amendment. 43
ii. Voluntary Contact
Moving a step forward in the spectrum brings the discussion into the
domain of voluntary contact. The most common form of voluntary contact that an
alien may have with U.S. authorities in a foreign territory involves a visa application
at a U.S. consulate office. The alien may apply for an immigrant or non-immigrant
visa.144 The United States, by virtue of its sovereignty, is under no international
oblig ation to allow the admission of aliens into its territory unless it desires to do
so. The recurring question, however, relates to instances where the U.S. has
chosen to provide access to qualifying aliens by law,146 but denies procedural due
process on the basis of the claimant's position on the alienage spectrum. Several
courts have considered the issue of whether an alien outside of the U.S. could have a
right to review for a visa denial by a consular officer. Some of the important
decisions are discussed as follows.
Although the notion "consular absolutism" 47 is a very well established
principle, its expressions are sporadic, at best, as there is no Supreme Court decision
defining its source and parameters. Two appellate court cases rendered in the late
148 149
1920s, United States ex rel. London v. Phelps and Ulrich v. Kellogg, could be
cited as the earliest expressions of this principle. While, in London, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected reviewability of consular decisions on grounds of
141. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
142. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272-73 (citing I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
(1984). ("Our statements in Lopez-Mendoza are therefore not dispositive on how the Court would rule on
a Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States if such a claim were squarely before us.
Even assuming such aliens would be entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, their situation is different
from respondents. The illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza were in the United States voluntarily and
presumably had accepted some societal obligations; but respondent had no voluntary connection with this
country that might place him among 'the people' of the United States.").
143. See, e.g., United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Utah 2003)
(holding that a formerly deported immigrant is not protected under the Fourth Amendment). For a
detailed discussion of this issue in light of this case, see VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA 69-91 (2005).
144. The INA defines the term "immigrant" by exclusion, i.e., "the term 'immigrant' means
every alien except an alien who is within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant alien," and goes on
listing nonimmigrant aliens who come to the U.S. temporarily. See INA sec. 101(a)(15) (listing all the
nonimmigrant categories).
145. See Ping, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
146. See, e.g., INS Sec. 203(a) (allowing the spouse, children, parents and siblings of U.S.
citizens to immigrate to the U.S. on the basis of the family relationship).
147. It stands for the proposition that the determinations of a consular officer are final and
unreviewable. For commentary see, e.g., James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular
Officers, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1991) (providing a critical review of the principle).
148. See United States ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288 (C.A.2 1927).
149. See United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (C.A.D.C 1929).
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lack of jurisdiction,'50 in Ulrich, the D.C. Circuit rejected the matter because it could
not find statutory authority to review consular decisions. 1 5  Almost a century later,
the D.C. Circuit revisited the same issue in Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, and
reaffirmed and articulated the principle of consular absolutism.152
As framed by the court, the issue in Bruno was "whether, under the
Administrative Procedure Act, an alien is entitled to judicial review of a consul's
denial of his application for a visa, and of the revocation of a visa he already
held."' 53 Bruno, a native of Bolivia, first came to America in 1993 on a non-
immigrant student visa. In 1995, he petitioned for a work related non-immigrant
visa, which was approved by the former INS.154 He was however, advised to travel
outside of the U.S., appear before a U.S. consular officer and collect the visa.
Relying on such advice, he traveled to Panama City and applied for a visa at a U.S.
consulate office there on May 16, 1996. Unfortunately for him, the consulate officer
denied the visa based on confidential information that Bruno was involved in drug
related criminal conduct. Bruno, who denied any wrongdoing, demanded a
hearing so that he could contest the charges. Since no such review procedures
existed, he traveled back to the U.S. on his initial non-immigrant visa, which had not
yet expired. He was briefly detained at the airport, and then released with a Court
date. On the said date, he appeared before immigration officials who told him to
resolve the matter at the U.S. consulate office in his home country of Bolivia. He
took the advice and traveled to Bolivia to obtain the visa.' 5 6 The U.S. consulate
office in Bolivia not only denied the new work visa, but also revoked the other
nonimmigrant visa that he already had. Although he did not see the confidential
evidence against him, he petitioned the Attorney General for a waiver. When he did
not hear from the Attorney General for two years, he filed a suit in the District Court
for the District of Columbia seeking a review of the denial and seeking a remedy for
the unreasonable delay in the waiverpetition based on the Administrative Procedure
Act's presumption of reviewability.
The D.C. Court of Appeals began its analysis by acknowledging Bruno's
argument that in the absence of express preclusion, judicial review of administrative
decisions must be presumed.' The Court, however, denied Bruno's claim in this
case based on three important theories that are unique to immigration. The first and
most important proposition is that more than a century of jurisprudence denies aliens
outside of the U.S. any right to recourse against the executive branch of government.
The Court supported this proposition by none other than the Chinese Exclusion Case.
It said:
For more than a century, the Supreme Court has thus recognized
150. See London, 22 F. 2d at 290.
151. See Ulrich, 30 F. 2d at 985-86. Although the D.C. Circuit said that it could not find any
statutory authority, it actually rejected the matter on its own merits. Its expression of the lack of statutory
authorization, however, remained the most important aspect of the decision.
152. 197 F. 3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
153. See Bruno, 197 F. 3d. at 1156.
154. See id. at 1155.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1155-56.
158. Id. at 1157 (citing, among other cases, Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190 (1993)).
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the power to exclude aliens as 'inherent in sovereignty, necessary
for maintaining normal international relations and defending the
country against foreign encroachments and dangers-a power to be
exercised exclusively by the political branches of government and
not granted away or restrained on behalf of anyone.'
Second, the Court made a spectrum argument, stating that aliens seeking a
visa abroad cannot have greater rights than those who are seeking admission at the
border. Again, among other cases, it relied on one of the Chinese Exclusion era
cases, i.e., Ekiu v. United States, which held that the due process of aliens seeking
admission at the border is limited to what the inspecting officer says it is because of
the plenary power doctrine. 1o In other words, the Court said, if such is the extent of
due process that an alien who is already at the border gets, one who is not even here
cannot claim a better right.161 Of course, the court conveniently failed to take in to
account Bruno's prior residence in the U.S. and also disregarded his reliance on the
advice of the immigration authorities in the U.S. As it has been explored in relation
to the Fourth Amendment above, a voluntary association or attachment with the U.S.
is an important consideration that the Supreme Court often looks at in determining
the extent of aliens' rights. Finally, the Court engaged in a technical statutory
interpretation exercise and concluded that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review
consular decisions.162 Bruno's importance is not limited to the specific jurisdiction
where it was rendered because it consolidated most of the grounds the other circuits
relied upon in confirming and reconfirming the principle of "consular absolutism."' 63
The breadth of this principle is such that it even affects the rights of U.S.
citizens because of their affinity with aliens. A constitutional challenge based on the
citizen's right to family unity has never succeeded. Hermina Sague v. United States
provides a good example of such a case.164 In this case, the plaintiffs, Sague, a U.S.
citizen and her husband, Berger, a French citizen, challenged the constitutionality of
165
the immigration laws that gave a consular officer's decision finality. A consular
officer denied Berger an immigrant visa for reasons neither he nor his U.S. citizen
wife understood. As they realized that the law was not on their side, they challenged
the constitutionality of the law based on the principle of family unity. Sague alleged
that, as a U.S. citizen, she had a right and a privilege to live with her husband.
The Court rejected this claim based on two main arguments. The first argument is
the same old assertion that congressional acts in the area of immigration are
159. See Bruno, 197 F. 3d at 1159 (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609
(1889); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1992); Hairisidas v. Shaughnessy, 242 U.S. 580, 596
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Reno v. American-Arab Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999)).
160. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892). In this case, a Japanese
woman was excluded on public charge grounds as she only had twenty-two dollars in cash when she
arrived. She, however, claimed that her husband, who was living in the U.S. then would support her and
she asked to contact him. The officer denied that privilege and ordered her deported. The Supreme Court
said that that was sufficient due process for the alien because Congress said so. See id.
161. See Bruno, 197 F. 3d at 1160-61.
162. See id. at 1162-64.
163. Some of the important old cases include: United States ex rel. London v. Phelps, 22 F. 2d
288 (2d Cir. 1927); United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F. 2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1929); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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unreviewable.167 As all other courts would do, this court also relied on one of the
Chinese Exclusion era cases, and subsequent cases that also rely on those cases.iss
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Court opined: "there is no constitutional
right of a citizen spouse, who voluntarily chooses to marry an alien outside the
jurisdiction of the United States, to have her alien spouse enter the United States."'
1 69
The Court concluded that "no citizen can, by the individual action of contracting
matrimony in a foreign jurisdiction with an alien, deprive the United States of as
fundamental an act of sovereignty as is the determination of what aliens may enter its
170
territory."
These two cases demonstrate the nature and extent of the due process rights
of aliens outside of the U.S. who voluntarily apply for a visa. The last case further
shows that even citizens could have the rights that they would otherwise have
curtailed because of their affiliation with aliens. It is important to note that both of
these cases derive their legitimacy from the Chinese Exclusion era cases.
b. Aliens Seeking Admission at the Border
Those who are able to evade the Coast Guard, obtain a visa from a
consulate office, or in some other way arrive at the border, must be inspected before
they are admitted or expelled; presumably, these categories of persons have a
minimum level of relationship with the U.S., as their feet are now dry and on U.S.
soil, which should form a basis for greater access to due process rights.
Nevertheless, courts have not established such a consistent correlation between level
of relationship to the United States and due process rights.
One of the Supreme Court's earliest cases that dealt with the due process
right of aliens seeking admission was Ekiu v. U.S.1 Because this case was decided
three years after the Chinese Exclusion case, it is also considered one of the Chinese
Exclusion era cases.173 The petitioner in this habeas proceeding, Ekiu, was a twenty-
five year old Japanese woman who only had twenty-two dollars on her person when
she arrived at a San Francisco port. 174 Under the then existing law, as it remains
today, an alien who is likely to become a public charge would be denied entry and
deported.175  When asked by an immigration officer how she might be able to
support herself in America, she replied that she had been married for two years to a
person who was then living in San Francisco and that he would contact her at a
certain hotel if she were to be allowed entry. Not believing the story, the officer
denied her entry and ordered her deported. She challenged the sufficiency of the due
process she was accorded by habeas corpus. To her disappointment, the Supreme
167. Id.
168. These include, Lem Moon Sing v. U.S., 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895); Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1949); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
169. See Sague, 416 F. Supp. at 220.
170. Id.
171. This is just a symbolic reference to the wet foot/dry foot policy mentioned in relation to
the Sale case.
172. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
173. See id.
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Court held:
It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners
who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or
residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the
country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in opposition
to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and
executive branches of the national government. As to such
persons, the decisions of executive or administrative officers,
acting within owers expressly conferred by congress, are due
process of law.
As a result, the Ekiu decision establishes that the due process that an arriving alien
may receive upon entry is limited to the inspecting officer's determination. Ekiu,
however, suggests that those who have already secured entry may have better rights.
The Supreme Court addressed this issue eleven years later in Yamataya v. Fisher.78
The petitioner in Yamataya, a Japanese woman like Ekiu, challenged the sufficiency
of the due process she was accorded by an immigration officer. m Unlike Ekiu,
Yamataya landed at the port of Seattle on July 11, 1891, and was not taken into
custody until July 23 of the same year.'so Therefore, she had twelve days of contact
with the U.S. before she was arrested.
The officer, who interviewed her in English, found that Yamataya had
admitted to being a "pauper" or in his view, a possible public charge, and ordered her
deported back to Japan by the vessel that brought her to Seattle. She challenged
the order on constitutional due process grounds. In particular, she alleged that when
the officer was talking to her, she did not even know he was investigating her, as she
did not understand English. In addition, she denied admitting to being a "pauper."
She also alleged that she was denied the right to counsel or any kind of consultation
and that the investigation was a "pretend" process and, as such, violated her due
process rights. 82  She then demanded the right to be heard so that she could
183
demonstrate that she would not be a public charge. To her disappointment, the
Supreme Court held:
If the appellant's want of knowledge of the English language put
her at some disadvantage in the investigation conducted by that
officer, that was her misfortune, and constitutes no reason, under
the acts of Congress, or under any rule of law, for the intervention
of the court by habeas corpus. We perceive no ground for such
intervention, none for the contention that due process of law was
denied to appellant.184
177. Id. at 660-61 (emphasis added).
178. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (commonly referred to as the, "Japanese
Immigrant" case).
179. See id. at 94-95.
180. See id.at 87.
181. See id. at 87-95.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 102.
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The rationale:
Now, it has been settled that the power to exclude or expel aliens
belonged to the political department of the government, and that
the order of an executive officer invested with the power to
determine finally the facts upon which an alien's right to enter this
country, or remain in it, depended, was "due process of law, and no
other tribunal, unless expressly authorized to do so, was at liberty
to re-examine the evidence on which he acted, or to controvert its
.185
sufficiency.
In relation to this, the Court suggested that the petitioners brief presence in the
country, twelve days, did not entitle her to better due process rights than a newly
arriving alien such as Ekiu. Although the Court also suggested that illegal
presence itself, regardless of the length of such stay, might preclude the application
of better constitutional due process, the Court stopped short of making that
determination in express terms. As will be discussed below, more than a hundred
years later, this issue is still a subject of great controversy. Despite this uncertainty,
however, there is no dispute that Yamataya stands for the proposition that more links
with the polity of the U.S. would entitle an alien to more rights. Unfortunately for
Yamataya, her twelve days in Seattle did not take her out of the arriving alien
category for purposes of constitutional due process.'
Existing rules appear to be predicated on the assumptions contained in these
Chinese Exclusion era cases. Although several legislative and judicial actions
separate the existing INA provisions on admission from the Chinese Exclusion cases,
the similarity between the standards set by Yamataya and some subsections of
185. Id. at 100 (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547
(1895)).
186. See id. at 100 ("Leaving on one side the question whether an alien can rightfully invoke
the due process clause of the Constitution who has entered the country clandestinely, and who has been
here for too brief a period to have become, in any real sense, a part of our population, before his right to
remain is disputed, we have to say that the rigid construction of the acts of Congress suggested by the
appellant are not justified.").
187. But note that the Court also said that:
"[T]his court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that
administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the
liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due
process of law' as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One
of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without
opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the
matters upon which that liberty depends, -not necessarily an opportunity upon a
regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that
will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the same
time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon which such officers are required
to act. Therefore, it is not competent for the Secretary of the Treasury or any
executive officer, at any time within the year limited by the statute, arbitrarily to
cause an alien who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects
to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here,
to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be
heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States.
No such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of
law are recognized." Id. at 100-01.
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existing INA §235 is unmistakable. In fact, some subsections of INA §235 appear to
be the codification of the Yamataya standard. Subsequent legislative actions have,
however, complicated the notion of admission in some significant ways. These
notions as well as their impact on the alienage spectrum are discussed in some detail
below.
Provisions of the INA § 235 closely track the decision in Yamataya.
Yamataya's physical presence for twelve days was insufficient to entitle her better
due process rights than Ekiu, who barely disembarked the vessel that brought her to
the U.S. Along the same lines, existing INA section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) provides: "If an
immigration officer determines that an alien [ ] who is arriving in the United States
or is described in clause (iii) is inadmissible under section 212(a)(C) [illegal entrants
and immigration violators] or 212(a)(7) [lack of valid documentation], the officer
shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing."' 88 if
an alien falls under the cross-referenced provisions because he or she is an illegal
entrant or immigration violator, the immigration officer's decision to deport would
be the entirety of due process that the alien would receive because it is not only final
but also unreviewable. This rule essentially codifies Ekiu.
Subsection (iii) of the same provision appears to extend Ekiu to Yamataya,
and beyond. It provides: "The Attorney General may apply clauses (i) and (ii) of this
subparagraph to any or all aliens described in subclause (1I) as designated by the
Attorney General. Such designation shall be in the sole and unreviewable discretion
of the Attorney General and may be modified at any time."l 89 The cross referenced
subsection (1I) in turn gives the Attorney General discretion to extend this swift and
expedited procedure by regulation to aliens who have been physically present in the
United States for less than two years. According to this provision, therefore, the
Court's insufficient connection under Yamataya could extend to up to two years of
presence in the U.S. However, existing regulations limit the reach of the INA §235
swift and expedited procedures to aliens apprehended within one hundred miles of
the border within fourteen days of their arrival. 90
According to these existing regulations, an alien who manages to travel at
least 101 miles or evades capture for at least fifteen days would have reduced
alienage points and may claim regular removal procedures under INA §240.
Although, as will be discussed below, INA § 240 itself has some fundamental due
process flaws, it would still entitle the alien to much better procedural due process
rights, including appearance before an immigration judge, right to proper
interpretation at government expense, right to counsel at his own expense,
administrative appeals, and some limited right ofjudicial review.191
The fourteen-day rule is quite interesting in light of Yamataya. Of course,
the Yamataya Court did not say how many days would provide sufficient
connections for more elaborate procedures to apply; it only suggested that twelve
days is not sufficient. According to INA §235 and regulations issued in accordance
with it, fifteen days would probably satisfy the sufficient connections requirement.
Though the exact number of days seems somewhat arbitrary, the notion that
188. See INA sec. 235(b)(1)(A)(i). Subsection (ii) provides an exception for asylum seekers.
189. See INA sec. 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(1).
190. See DHS Notice Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug.
11,2004).
191. See INA sec. 240,242.
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a greater number of days establishes a firmer connection is a sensible approach with
respect to the alienage spectrum. However, this largely coherent approach to
establishing a connection to the United States is disrupted in instances where the
alien severs an established connection to the United States and later seeks to reclaim
that connection. This phenomenon often occurs when a lawful resident travels
abroad and seeks to be readmitted. The main problem relates to the circumstances
that are considered to sever the relationship subjecting the former resident to
minimal due process just like newly arriving aliens. This issue has over the years
arisen in different contexts. The following cases and statutory rules demonstrate the
disorder that this problem brings to the alienage spectrum.
The Supreme Court's earliest post-World War II due process
pronouncement was contained in Knauff v. Shaughnessy. Knauff was a German
national; she married a naturalized U.S. citizen in Germany and attempted to enter
the U.S. to naturalize. The Attorney General denied her entry without any
process, citing national security concerns, and ordered her deported citing statutory
authority that allowed him to do so. 194 She challenged the constitutionality of the
process by habeas corpus. Relying exclusively on the Chinese Exclusion era
cases, the Court held that as long as Congress gave the executive officials the
exclusive right to admit an alien or deny her admission, the decision of such
executive officer is "final and conclusive."' 9 6  The Court further added that,
"Whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry
into the United States, it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly
authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the
Government to exclude a given alien." 97 Knauff's relationship with the U.S. was
limited to her marriage to a U.S. citizen and work for the U.S. military in Germany.
She had never been to the U.S. prior to her attempt to enter. In that sense, although
she had better connections with the U.S. than, for example, Ekiu or Yamataya, the
process she received was exactly the same as those two Japanese nationals who came
almost a century before her.
To make matters worse, the Court expanded the same principle to aliens
who had actually lived in the U.S. for a long time prior to their departure and
application for reentry. The case that extended the same principle to returning lawful
residents is Mezei v. Shaughnessy.198 Mezei, a resident of the U.S. for twenty-five
years, traveled to his country of origin to visit his dying mother and returned to the
U.S. after nineteen months. The Attorney General excluded him without a hearing
based on confidential national security information.200 He challenged the exclusion
and continued detention on constitutional due process grounds.201 Again, predicated
192. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
193. See id. at 539-40.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 543 (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948);
cf Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903)).
197. Id.
198. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).




HeinOnline  -- 20 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 116 2010
THE ALIENAGE SPECTRUM DISORDER
on the Chinese Exclusion era cases and their progeny,202 the Court rejected all of
Mezei's challenges, including the lack of procedural due process and possible
indefinite detention. 03 The Court had to overcome its own apparent contrary ruling
in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding the same year. In Chew, the petitioner, a lawful
permanent resident that worked on a U.S. registered vessel as a chief steward, was
summarily excluded from admission when returning after four months of voyage on
board the vessel.20 The Court extended the procedural due process rights that would
206
ordinarily apply to permanent residents to him despite his four months of absence.
In distinguishing Mezei from Chew, the Court said that unlike Mezei, Chew served
on a U.S. vessel for four months while he was away, and that he had security
207
clearance. Mezei, however, stayed outside of the U.S. "behind the Iron Curtain for
208
19 months," which "assimilated" him into the arriving alien category.
These two cases suggests that any entitlement to constitutional due process
accrued as a result of long term lawful residence may be lost because of absence for
a certain period of time, the length and nature of which depends on the
circumstances. While four months was not sufficient to sever Chew's relations with
the U.S. as he worked on a U.S. registered vessel during his absence, Mezei's
nineteen months of absence "behind the Iron Curtain" was sufficient to completely
sever the relationship and totally alienate him.
The Court faced the same issue again some three decades later in Landon v.
Plasencia.209 Plasencia, a long-time permanent resident who was married to a U.S.
citizen and had U.S. citizen children, briefly traveled to Mexico and was stopped at
the border while attempting to smuggle undocumented persons.2o Despite her
lawful residence and several connections, the immigration service placed her in
exclusion proceedings designed for newcomers rather than deportation proceedings
designed for the removal of persons already in the U.S.211 Because the exclusion
proceedings granted fewer due process rights than the deportation proceedings, she
challenged the legality of the process by habeas corpus. The Court held that she
could be considered as an arriving alien and be subjected to the inferior exclusion
proceedings, but those proceedings themselves have to be fair.213 The Court
remanded the case to the lower court for the determination of whether she had
202. See id. at 210 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537
(1950); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)).
203. See id. at 210-11. Although perhaps the most important due process issue in this case was
the possibility of Mezei's indefinite detention, as no country was willing to take him, this case is also
important on the issue of procedural due process as the Court considered him a new arrival despite his
prior long term residence.
204. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
205. See id. at 601.
206. See id. at 596, 599-601.
207. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214-15.
208. See id. at 214.
209. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
210. See id. at 23-24.
211. See id.
212. The Court agreed that exclusion proceedings provide inferior due process rights because
of several reasons, among them, the right to be informed of the charges in a timely manner, representation,
right to direct appeal, except a challenge by habeas corpus, etc. See id. at 35-36.
213. See id. at 36-37.
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received due process that passes the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test.214
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court had to address two of its own
decisions that appeared to conflict with this decision. The first was the Chew
decision in which the Court said a four-month absence did not sever the alien's
relationship with the U.S. because he had worked on a U.S. registered vessel during
his absence. In the application of the principles in Chew, the Court said that the case
215
was never about the exact forum, but it was about the nature of the due process.
As a result, the Court limited its Chew decision to the proposition that whatever the
process might be, it needs to pass the Mathews test. The second challenge to the
216
Court's line of reasoning came from the Court's decision in Rosenberg v. Fleuti,
where it held that an "innocent, casual and brief excursion" is insufficient to sever
the ties and subject the alien to rules of entry.217 In response to this challenge, the
Court said that the issue of whether Plasencia was effecting an "entry" within the
meaning of Fleuti may be determined in exclusion proceedings as long as those
proceedings themselves are considered sufficient.218 Although the Court repeatedly
recognized that exclusion proceedings are inferior,219 it reverted back to the Chinese
Exclusion rationale that due process is whatever Congress says it is, even when the
alien has been a permanent resident.220 This conclusion is effectively a significant
retreat from Chew and an endorsement of Mezei.2 2 1
The cases discussed above demonstrate that, although the Supreme Court
professes to adhere to the principle of an ascending scale of rights, a concept as old
as the Chinese Exclusion era, in reality it has gone back and forth, completely
disordering the spectrum. There is no better example of the disorder than the above
discussed four cases: Knauff Chew, Mezei, and Plasencia. If the Court had strictly
adhered to the ascending scale of connections theory it espoused since at least
1903,222 none of the four cases would have come out the way they did. An ascending
scale or spectrum analysis would have allowed all of the petitioners the better due
process rights that apply in deportation proceedings. In denying due process rights
to Knauff, the Court concluded that her marriage to a U.S. citizen and her work for
the U.S. military in Germany were immaterial. Although Eisentrager would have
supported this decision, it is doubtful if Boumediene would do the same. Mezei's
twenty-five years of permanent residence were completely overshadowed by his
214. See id. at 34 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). Mathews' three
part balancing test basically looks at the importance of the interest of the applicant and the interest of the
government in dispensing with the procedures.).
215. See id. at 33-34.
216. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
217. See Plasencia. 459 U.S. at 28-29 (citing Fleuti, 459 U.S. at 462).
218. See id. at 31-32.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 34-35. ("The role of the judiciary is limited to determining whether the procedures
meet the essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause and does not extend to imposing
procedures that merely displace congressional choices of policy. Our previous discussion has shown that
Congress did not intend to require the use of deportation procedures in cases such as this one. Thus, it
would be improper simply to impose deportation procedures here because the reviewing court may find
them preferable. Instead, the courts must evaluate the particular circumstances and determine what
procedures would satisfy the minimum requirements of due process on the re-entry of a permanent
resident alien.").
221. Although the Court expressly said Mezei did not apply in this case. See id. at 34.
222. See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 106 (1903).
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nineteen months of absence. Chew, however, maintained his relationship with the
U.S. despite the fact that his residence in the U.S. and other connections were less
than half that of Mezei. Plasencia's situation is anomalous. Despite her strong
relationship to the U.S., including family ties and a long-term lawful residence, the
Court was not willing to grant her the better of two alternative removal procedures.
In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the old ruling that the judiciary must not second-
guess the actions of Congress in the area of admission and exclusion of aliens. By
injecting some irregular cases such as Chew, however, the Court made the disorder
worse.
In 1996, Congress codified this disordered spectrum by abandoning the
concept of entry and replacing it with a more elusive concept of "admission." It
defined "admission" as "the lawful entry of [an] alien into the United States after
,224
inspection and authorization." According to this definition, even if an alien has
lived in the U.S. for thirty years or more following an un-inspected entry, he would
remain an un-admitted alien with almost no substantive rights, but some procedural
due process rights. As will be discussed in some detail in section c below, despite
the long-standing jurisprudential "truth" to the contrary, the newly adopted notion of
"admission" worsened the already existing disorder in the alienage spectrum by
disqualifying "un-admitted" long-term residents from a number of immigration and
other forms of benefits.
Congress also discussed the concept of severance of ties, once linked to
entry, to its definition of admission. Congress made elaborate and specific rules that
seem to codify the disorder in the case law discussed above. In particular, it
provided that a lawful permanent resident might be deemed to be seeking admission
just like a newly arriving alien if the alien:
(i) has abandoned or relinquished that status,
(ii) has been absent from the United States for a continuous period
in excess of 180 days,
(iii) has engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United
States,
(iv) has departed from the United States while under legal process
seeking removal of the alien from the United States, including
removal proceedings under this Act and extradition proceedings,
(v) has committed an offense identified in section 212(a)(2), unless
since such offense the alien has been granted relief under section
212(h) or 240A(a), or
(vi) is attempting to enter at a time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers or has not been admitted to the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer. 225
223. See INA sec. 101(a)(13) as amended by sec. 301 of Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (consolidating
what used to be known as exclusion and deportation proceedings into a solitary "removal" proceeding. It
did not, however, change the fundamental distinction between exclusion and deportation.); see id. at sec.
306.
224. See INA sec. 101(a)(13)(A).
225. Id.
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Any one of these acts or omissions would eliminate social and juridical connections
that the alien might have developed, and render him a newcomer subjecting him to
the inferior form of due process that newly arriving aliens receive. The IRA's
introduction of this elaborate list of acts and omissions that purportedly sever
existing ties and thus remove the alien from the realm of due process protection, adds
to the disorder in the alienage spectrum by undermining the notion of an ascending
scales of rights derived from rootedness in the community.
c. Undocumented Aliens
By far the single most important category that disorders the whole notion of
the alienage spectrum or the notion of the ascending scale of rights is the
undocumented-aliens category. Under existing law, long-term residents who have
entered without inspection derive no better rights as a result of their connections than
all of the above-discussed categories. In fact, in most instances, they have fewer
rights because of their unauthorized entry or stay. For example, while an alien who
marries a U.S. citizen may lawfully enter and naturalize within threeyears and claim
the full range of constitutional rights and privileges due to citizens, a thirty-seven
year old woman,227 whose parents brought her to the U.S. at age one and lived in the
U.S. ever since, will have no hope of claiming legal status and the full protection of
the Constitution. She will either remain an alien forever in the shadows or face
deportation at any time. She is also excluded from claiming almost all forms of
relief from deportation. For example, if she had married a U.S. citizen at age twenty-
eight and was blessed with three healthy U.S. citizen children, she would still face
deportation as she would not be able to adjust her status because of her unlawful
entry three dozen years before.228 Her thirty-seven years of residence would give her
no ascending rights whatsoever. Had the spectrum not been disordered, she would
have had better substantive and procedural rights than the woman who became a
U.S. citizen within three years of her coming to America. Moreover, in the event of
a deportation proceeding against her, she would not be able to claim cancellation of
removal. Having a U.S. citizen husband and three healthy children would not
demonstrate, "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship," as required by the
229
existing rules. This disorder in the spectrum, which gives a three year resident full
rights and privileges and denies the most basic of rights to a thirty-seven year
resident who has a U.S. citizen husband and children, is a result of Congress's
introduction of the concept of admission in 1996, which exasperated the disorder in
230the spectrum.
This problem is not limited to substantive ineligibility to immigration
226. See INA sec. 319 (a).
227. Age thirty-seven is chosen because as of the writing of this article a thirty-eight year old
unauthorized entrant may be able to claim lawful status under registry, which currently applies to persons
who entered the U.S. prior to January 1, 1972. See INA sec. 249. This example also assumes that she
failed to take advantage of the 1986 legalization program, which is not unlikely. See id.
228. See INA 245(a) (requiring inspection and admission for adjustment of status). A
temporary provision that would have allowed adjustment despite unauthorized entry has long expired and
never got renewed. See INA 245(1). Thirty-seven years of age is chosen because if she had entered
before January 1, 1972, she would have been able to adjust her status under INA 249, a legalization
provision known as registry.
229. See INA sec. 240A(b)(1).
230. See INA sec. 245(a).
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benefits. The illegality of the presence opens the door to uncertainties of rights and
privileges for undocumented migrants in other areas. For example, there is serious
uncertainty about the applicability of the Fourth Amendment vis-A-vis undocumented
migrants. This uncertainty emanates from the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in
U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 23 which suggested that an alien would need "substantial
and voluntary" connections with the U.S. to be considered a member of the
232
community or be a part of the "people," to whom the Fourth Amendment applies.
By so doing, the Court reduced the Fourth Amendment from a prudential rule of
control against government abuse, to a right that the Constitution would grant to a
privileged category of persons called "the people." Because the Court never
articulated the nature and extent of the needed connections, persons illegally present
remain at all times vulnerable. For example, in U.S. v. Ezparza-Mendoza, a U.S.
District Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect a Mexican national
who lived in the U.S. illegally for two years because of his illegal presence as well as
some illegal conduct.234
In the context of immigration proceedings, however, the issue of the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment is a settled matter. The Supreme Court made
a categorical determination in IN.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza.235 In particular, the Court
ruled that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be used in
.236
removal proceedings.
The respondents in Lopez-Mendoza challenged the admissibility of
evidence in their removal proceedings on grounds that the evidence was obtained in
violation of the plaintiff s Fourth Amendment rights.237 The controversy arose out of
two separate incidents of illegal searches and seizures, which led to the respondents'
admission of illegal presence. Per Justice O'Connor, the Court held that the
exclusionary rule does not apply in immigration proceedings for several reasons,
including that immigration proceedings are civil proceedings as opposed to criminal
proceedings,239 and most importantly, that "the 'body' or identity of a defendant or
231. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
232. See id. at 265.
233. 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D. Utah 2003).
234. For a thorough discussion of the implications of this case, see ROMERO, supra note 141
at 69-91. For a discussion on the implications of illegal presence on the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment, see generally, Michael A. Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens:
To What Extent Do They Survive United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 56 Mo. L. REV. 213 (1991) (arguing
that the Fourth Amendment must apply regardless of the immigration status of the aggrieved person).
235. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
236. See id. at 1051-52.
237. See id. at 1036-37.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 1038 ("A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility
to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this
country is itself a crime. The deportation hearing looks prospectively to the respondent's right to remain
in this country in the future. Past conduct is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the respondent's
right to remain.") To support this conclusion, the Court noted that Courts of Appeals have held that
evidence obtained without Miranda warnings is admissible in deportation proceedings. See id. (citing
Navia-Duran v. I.N.S., 568 F.2d 803, 808 (CA l 1977); Avila-Gallegos v. I.N.S., 525 F.2d 666, 667 (CA2
1975); Chavez-Raya v. I.N.S, 519 F.2d 397, 399-401 (CA7 1975); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,
236-37 (1960)); Suggesting that ex post facto laws do not apply in deportation proceedings (citing Galvan
v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954)). Noting the admissibility of involuntary confession in deportation
proceedings (citing United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923)).
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respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of
an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or
interrogation occurred." 2 4  It is moderately surprising that Justice O'Connor would
suggest that the identity of a person is the body rather than some government
documentation attesting to his legal status, and that attempting to suppress the
"body" would be futile as Lopez-Mendoza probably looks and talks like a Mexican
immigrant.
Finally, although some undocumented immigrants may have the
"substantial and voluntary connections" required under Verdugo-Urquidez because
of their long-term residence, they nevertheless have fewer rights than newly arriving
documented aliens. This completely undermines the whole notion of the ascending
scale of rights doctrine and further disorders the alienage spectrum. In the case of
the long-term resident discussed above, despite her thirty-seven years of residence, a
U.S. citizen husband and three U.S. citizen children would arguably give her the
required level of substantial and voluntary connections for her to be considered a part
of the "people," she would have fewer rights than almost all other categories of
aliens.
d Admitted Aliens
Aliens admitted into the country with lawful credentials could be classified
into several categories. For purposes of highlighting the spectrum issues, they are
discussed in four different subcategories below.
i. Non-immigrants
Persons admitted under the non-immigrant category are supposed to be in
the U.S. for specific purposes, and must return upon the accomplishment of that
242
purpose. Presumably, they are entitled to the benefits the law attaches to the
respective non-immigrant category. The whole notion of the ascending scale of
rights does not have direct applicability with respect to this category. In fact, almost
invariably their rights diminish with time as most categories expire and become non-
renewable.243
240. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039-40 (citing among other cases the 1924 case of
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923)). In addition to these two factors, the
Court also noted the administrative hurdles that the exclusionary rule would impose as well as the minimal
deterrent value it may have. It finally made an exception for an egregious violation of the Fourth
Amendment. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043-1052. Some Courts of Appeals have adopted an
expanded view of the egregious violation exception in excluding illegally obtained evidence in removal
proceedings. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 22 F. 3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).
241. In fact, the only category that she is better off in terms of procedural due process is the
arriving alien category, which will be subject to the expedited removal procedure under INA sec. 235.
She will get the regular INA sec. 240 removal procedure because of her thirty-seven years of presence.
Even then, her rights are not better than the rights that a person who had arrived fifteen days prior to his
apprehension, as the expedited procedures are limited to persons who get apprehended with fourteen days
of their arrival within one-hundred miles of the border. See INA sec. 235 (b)(l)(A)(iii)(l)-(Il) (providing a
two year limit); but see 69 Fed. Reg. 48877 (Aug. I1, 2004) (limiting it to fourteen days).
242. See INA sec. 101(a)(15) (enumerating all of the non-immigrant categories and specifying
the terms of admission.)
243. See, e.g., INA Sec. 101(a)(15((H)(1)(b) (explaining that temporary visa for work are
renewable only once); see also 101(a)(15)(F) (noting temporary visa for study, the validity of which is
limited to the duration of the study).
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A more interesting aspect of the position of non-immigrants on the alienage
spectrum is the fact that extended stays beyond the authorized period, despite the
voluntary and substantial relations that it might give them, would not only make
them deportable but also inadmissible for periods ranging from three years to ten
years.244 Ironically, the longer they stay, the fewer rights they accrue. As such, the
entire non-immigrant category is a category that defies the whole notion of the
245
ascending scale of rights, thereby completely disordering the spectrum.
ii. Immigrants
Immigrants in this context are persons who come to the U.S.
permanently. Immigrants come under either one of four different categories:
family,247 business,248 refugee 249 and diversity visa.250 If everything works well,
there is no disorder in the spectrum within each category. While those who
immigrate through marriage may naturalize within three years,251 all those who
immigrate through the other three categories may naturalize within five years of their
252
admission. This indicates that three or five years of stay would give them the
required connections to become full members of the community and to be considered
the "people."
However, things do not go well for some immigrants, creating a serious
challenge to the ascending scale of rights doctrine. Before an immigrant can
naturalize, there is always the possibility of deportation. The most common grounds
for deportation are extended absence from the U.S. and commission of crimes, which
may include misdemeanors. As demonstrated in some detail below, the latter
category disorders the spectrum more than the former. The discussion begins with
244. See INA sec. 212(a)(9)(B) (providing for grounds of inadmissibility on grounds of illegal
entry and overstay). See also INA sec. 237(a)(1)(C) (providing that non-immigrant visa violators are
deportable).
245. It must, however, be noted that courts have recognized some levels of rights of non-
immigrants in non-immigration related contexts, in particular as it relates to their liberty and property
interests. See, e.g. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). Although Mathews upheld a federal law that
discriminated against lawful permanent residents with respect to eligibility for Medicare, citing
Congress's plenary power to regulate the conditions of aliens, it recognized some liberty and property
rights of all aliens. See id. at 77-78 ("There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the
United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects everyone of these
persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... [e]ven those whose
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory are entitled to that constitutional
protection." Id. at 78 (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950); Russian Volunteer
Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)).
It is also important to note that Congress has also, on occasion, made rules that apply to lawful permanent
residents in the same way as they do to non-immigrants. See David A. Martin, Graduated Application of
Constitutional Protection for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 96-
97 (2001). Professor Martin ranks non-immigrants third on his six-class spectrum that includes citizens,
lawful permanent residents, admitted non-immigrants, entrants without inspection, parolees, and
applicants at the border. See id. at 92-93. This article has taken a broader view of the spectrum and its
foundations, and also included several more categories.
246. See INA sec. 101(a)(15) (defining the immigrant category by exclusion).
247. See INA sec. 203(a).
248. See INA sec. 203(b).
249. See INA sec. 207 & 208.
250. See INA sec. 203(c).
251. See INA sec. 319(a).
252. See INA sec. 316.
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the former. As indicated in subsection C (1) above, under the INA, a person
admitted for permanent residence is deemed to be seeking inadmission if he has
253
abandoned the status or if he has been absent for more than 180 days. That means
a person who has lived as a permanent resident for decades, but left for her country
of origin or any other country, and stayed there for 181 days, could be subjected to
grounds of inadmissibility under INA 2,2a), which are generally broader than
grounds of deportability under INA 237(a). Rosenberg v. Fleuti demonstrates the
dramatic consequences of being subjected to grounds of inadmissibility rather than
grounds of deportability.25 The Court in this case held that a return from a casual,
brief, and innocent departure does not amount to entry.256 If Fleuti's return was
considered an entry, he would be subject to a rule that would render him
inadmissible and result in deportation, whereas if he did not leave the country before
he could naturalize, he would not face deportation.257
Similar consequences could result under existing provisions of the INA. If,
for example, a long term lawful permanent resident departs from the U.S. and comes
back 181 days later, and admits to the inspecting officer "the essential elements of a
crime of moral turpitude," even if there was no conviction, he would be considered
inadmissible and sent back.258 These crimes may range from shoplifting259 to
possession of stolen bus transfers,260 from going into the subway without a ticket261
to burglary.262 Decades of residence and socio-economic ties cannot help him
because the 181 days are considered to have severed his pre-existing connections.
The grounds for deportability under 237(a) are actually more ironic in their
role in disordering the alienage spectrum because there is a strange time component
built into them. The time notion enshrined in these provisions directly contradicts
the notion of the ascending scale of rights or the substantial connections test. For
example, the INA provides that "[a]ny alien who- (I) is convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude committed within five years .. . after the date of
admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer
maybe imposed[,] is deportable. 263 This particular ground of deportation and the
time component preserve the ascending scale of rights by limiting the grounds for
deportation to a crime committed before the alien could have established more than
253. See INA sec. 101(a)(13)(C).
254. Compare INA sec. 212(a) and INA sec. 237(a). The Court in this case held that a return
from a casual, brief and innocent departure does not amount to entry. If Fleuti's return was considered a
reentry, he would have been subject to a rule that would have rendered him inadmissible resulting in his
deportation even if it would not have resulted in his deportation had he not left the country before he could
naturalize.
255. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
256. Seeidat.462.
257. Id. at 450-53.
258. Compare INA sec. 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(1) and INA sec. 237(a)(2)(B) (limiting it to
convictions and also imposing a time limit). Note, however, that sec. 212(a) has an exception for a single
petty offense. See INA sec. 212(a)((A)(ii).
259. See, e.g. Da Rosa Silva v. I.N.S., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1010-12 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(holding that shoplifting constitutes a crime of moral turpitude). See also Matter of Esfandiary, 16 1. & N.
Dec. 659 (B.I.A. 1979) (holding that trespassing, if malicious, constitutes a crime of moral turpitude).
260. See, e.g., Michel v. I.N.S., 206 F. 3d 253, 261 (2nd Cir. 2000).
261. See, e.g., Santos-Gonzalez v. Reno, 93 F. Supp. 2d 286, 288 n. 3 (E.D. N.Y. 2000).
262. See, e.g., Cuevas-Gasparv. Gonzales, 430 F. 3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).
263. INA sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(i).
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five years worth of substantial connections, but also disorder it by failing to credit
every additional year of connections accrued after the crime. To illustrate, a person
who was admitted for permanent residency in 1970 and committed a crime of moral
264
turpitude in 1975 may be considered deportable in 2009 for that same crime.
Perhaps the main category of crimes that has absolutely no respect for long-
term residence or any level of substantial connections is that of the aggravated
felony.265 A creation of the immigration law, the term aggravated felony refers to a
wide range of felonies as well as misdemeanors. 266 If a long-term lawful resident
commits an 2aggravated felony, including shopliftin, that earns a suspended sentence
of one year, she will not only face deportation and be ineligible for all forms of
269 270
relief from deportation, but she will also be barred from ever coming back. Her
decades of lawful residence and any level of substantial relations would give her no
better rights than those of a person who arrived the day before. This category of
offenses completely disregards the ascending scale of rights. Furthermore, some of
the crimes that are considered apgravated felonies under the INA may actually be
misdemeanors under state law.
All three branches of government do their own share of crafting
immigration laws and policies. Together, about a century ago, they created this
notion that some immigrants are more alien than others and repeated the same theme
consistently throughout the last century. The laws they made intermittently failed to
respect their own theory of the ascending scale of rights. As demonstrated in the
above sections, some long-term residents do indeed have fewer rights than
newcomers. In absolute terms, all long-term un-naturalized residents are vulnerable
to deportation and permanent bar for crimes as trivial as shoplifting, despite several
decades of residence. Not surprisingly, however, the courts use the substantial
connections test to deny rights based on the lack of substantial connections rather
than to use the presence of substantial connections to grant more rights; such usage
began to change with Rasul v. Bush in 2004.7
Before providing a detailed summary and analysis of the Court's use of the
substantial relations test over the last century and the subsequent changes with the
Guantanamo cases, the impact of acquiring citizenship on the alienage spectrum
must be addressed. The next section provides this information.
264. It is important to note, however, that he may be eligible for a one-time cancellation or
removal relief. See INA sec. 240A(a).
265. See INA sec. 101(a)(43).
266. See id. (defining an aggravated felony).
267. See INA sec. 101(a)(43)(G) (defining an aggravated felony as including "a theft offense
for which one year is given"). The suspension of the sentence does not make a difference. See INA
(a)(48)(B).
268. See INA sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) ("Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at
any time after admission is deportable.").
269. See INA sec. 208(b)(2)(B)(i) (barring asylum for a person who committed an aggravated
felony); INA sec. 240B(a)(1)&(b)(1)(C) (barring voluntary departure); INA sec. 240A (barring
cancellation of removal); and also INA sec. 245(a) (barring adjustment of status wherever potentially
applicable).
270. See INA sec. 212(a)(9)(A).
271. See, e.g. Matter of Small, 23 1. & N. Dec. 448 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding that a state
misdemeanor offense may be considered an aggravated felony for the purposes of immigration law).
272. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (extending the right of habeas corpus
extraterritorially).
2010] I125
HeinOnline  -- 20 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 125 2010
BERKELEY LA RAZA LA WJOURNAL
e. Citizens
Citizens273 are the "people" or the only category of persons entitled to all
274
the protections of the Constitution. Citizens are also entitled to exclude all non-
citizens.275  Just like the alienage spectrum, however, there is also a citizenship
spectrum. Some citizens are more citizen than others. Rooted in sociological
constructs, the citizenship spectrum often enjoys significant legal manifestations.
This section discusses the legal manifestations of the spillover of the alienage
spectrum into the citizenship spectrum.
As a matter of law, the citizenship spectrum has a constitutional basis. In
fact, the text of the Constitution recognizes it to a certain extent. For example, a
naturalized U.S. citizen does not qualify to occupy a seat in the House of
Representatives before seven years have passed since she naturalized.276 Similarly,
if she wants to occupy a seat in the United States Senate, she would need nine years
of post-citizenship residence.277 These disabilities are temporary. Perhaps the most
well known permanent disability is the total and unconditional exclusion of
naturalized citizens from seeking the 8residency. The Constitution preserves the
presidency for a "natural born citizen."
Aside from these constitutional provisions marking a clear distinction
between some categories of citizens in relation to political office, revisions to the
INA in 1990 shifted the power of naturalization from the courts to the Attorney
General.279 This shift indicates that newly naturalized citizens might have their
citizenship revoked through an administrative proceeding in the immigration court
system, thus suggesting that newly naturalized citizens are not full members of the
community. INA section 340(h) demonstrates this by stating that "[n]othing
contained in this section be regarded as limiting, denying, or restricting the power of
the Attorney General to correct, alter, modify, or vacate an order naturalizing the
person."280 Based on this seeming grant of power, former Attorney General Janet
Reno enacted implementing regulations.28 In those regulations she limited the
282
exercise of such power to two years from the date of naturalization. In other
words, the regulations assume that a naturalized citizen is barely American for at
least two years since naturalization and allow an immigration judge to revoke
273. Citizenship is a difficult concept. For a thorough discussion of the concept of citizenship
and its various connotations, see LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 17-36 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (concluding that although the concept
is a subject of great controversy its meaning is "not entirely indeterminate. Status, rights, political
participation, and identity represent the core of its analytical concerns.").
274. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990).
275. See id.; see also Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
276. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2.
277. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3.
278. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 5.
279. See INA sec. 301(a), 8 U.S.C. 1401(a) (2006); see also Immigration Act of 1990,
§408(a)(1), Act of Nov. 29, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (adding "The sole authority to
naturalize persons as citizens of the United States is conferred upon the Attorney General."); Another
source of minor confusion has been a provision that allowed the Attorney General to cancel a certificate of
naturalization, while expressly saying that cancellation of the certificate "shall affect the certificate not the
citizenship status of the person." See INA § 342, 8 U.S.C. 1453 (2006).
280. See INA § 340(h), 8 U.S.C. 1451(h) (2006).
281. 8 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2009).
282. See id.
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citizenship through removal proceedings. Ordinarily, citizenship may only be
revoked after a judicial determination of the facts and the law. In fact, the INA itself
provides that "[i]t shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective
districts, upon affidavit showing good cause thereof, to institute proceedings in any
district court of the United States in the judicial district in which the naturalized
citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit. . . ."m
However, Attorney General Reno's attempt to maintain administrative
jurisdiction over newly naturalized, barely American citizens was permanently
284
enjoined by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2000 in Gorbach v. Reno. In
Gorbach, the court rejected all of Reno's statutory arguments, includin5 the
argument that the right to denaturalize is inherent in the right to naturalize, an
argument that suggests that an alien would always remain an alien even if
naturalized. To her credit, Reno limited that to two years by regulation. The
language that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (en banc) used in rejecting Reno's
inherent power argument is quite interesting:
There is no general principle that what one can do, one can undo.
It sounds good, just as the Beatles' lyrics "Nothing you can know
that isn't known/ Nothing you can see that isn't shown/ Nowhere
you can be that isn't where you're meant to be," sound good. But
as Sportin' Life said, "It ain't necessarily so." Congress has
confirmed the traditional inherent power of United States District
Courts to vacate their own judgments. But there is no statutory
confirmation of any inherent power the Immigration and
Naturalization Service may have to vacate its judgments, except
for its narrow authority to cancel certificates without affecting
citizenship." 286
Although this injunction is still in effect, this whole controversy
283. INS § 340(a), 8 U.S.C. 1451(a) (2006).
284. Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F. 3d. 1087, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000).
285. Id. at 1098-99. ("Citizenship in the United States of America is among our most
valuable rights. For many of us, it is all that protects our life, liberty, and property from arbitrary
deprivation... An executive department cannot simply decide, without express statutory authorization, to
create an internal executive procedure to deprive people of those rights without even going to court. For
the Attorney General to gain the terrible power to take citizenship away without going to court, she needs
Congress to say so. The district court correctly held that the new regulations for administrative
denaturalization were promulgated without authority from Congress. Congress has provided one way to
revoke the citizenship of a naturalized American citizen: that is for a United States Attorney to file a
petition in a United States District Court. There is no statutory warrant for a second way, whereby the
Immigration and Naturalization Service would revoke a person's citizenship administratively.").
286. Id. at 1095. In relation to this, the same court further noted that:
[i]f the power of courts to vacate their own judgments needs confirmation by an
express rule approved by Congress, it is too much to infer an analogous power in
the Attorney General, for so weighty a matter as revocation of American
citizenship, from silence. The formula the government urges, that what one can do,
one can undo, is sometimes true, sometimes not. A person can give a gift, but
cannot take it back. A minister, priest, or rabbi can marry people, but cannot grant
divorces and annulments for civil purposes. A jury can acquit, but cannot revoke its
acquittal and convict. Whether the Attorney General can undo what she has the
power to do, naturalize citizens, depends on whether Congress said she could. Id.
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demonstrates the underlying assumption about the relationship between duration of
stay, the nature and extent of ties, allegiance, and even racial or ethnic identity.
There is no doubt that social perceptions influence policy and consequently find
expression in rules and regulations. Reno's denationalization policy is one such
example. Unfortunately, however, other policies have not been as transparent as
Reno's two years of transition period to full citizenship. For centuries the perpetual
alienage cloud has affected many communities regardless of how many generations
of ties they have. Although the perception that some Americans are more American
than others is as old as the nation itself, wartime exigencies have always reinforced
the notion that citizenship is more than the possession of a naturalization or birth
certificate.
A good starting point to demonstrate how citizens were treated like aliens
because of their ethnicity or national origin may begin with the internment and
deportation of persons of German origin during World War I. Historical records
suggest that due to the insecurity created by World War I, the United States banished
or interned an estimated twelve to sixty-three hundred persons of German ancestry
under suspicion of disloyalty.2 8 7  Similar acts of internment and deportation were
repeated against persons of German ancestry during World War II. During the
same period, a more compressive act of alienation was committed against persons of
Japanese ancestry, citizens and non-citizens alike. It took the form of widespread
289
and systematic internment and maltreatment. United States citizens of Japanese
ancestry who resisted the internment measure challenged the constitutionality of the
military and legislative actions that made the internment of hundreds of thousands of
innocent people possible. The seminal case that condoned the constitutionality of
this race-based measure is none other than the infamous Korematsu v. United
States.290
Fred Korematsu, a natural born United States citizen who is identified in
court records mainly by his middle name Toyosaburo instead of Fred,291 was
convicted of the violation of a civilian exclusion order that prohibited persons of
Japanese ancestry from certain areas. The measure was not limited to exclusion
from some sensitive militarily areas. B that time a decision had already been made
to intern persons of Japanese ancestry. The dissent in Korematsu argued that the
imprisonment of a United States citizen in an internment camp "solely because of his
287. See generally E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY, 1798-1965,424 (1981).
288. See Karen E. Ebel, WWII Violations of German Americans' Civil Liberties by the U.S.
Government, (2003) available at http://www.foitimes.com/internment/gasummary.htm (reporting that
about 11,000 persons of German ancestry were interned).
289. The internment of Japanese Americans and Japanese immigrants during WWII is a
subject of immense scholarly literature. See generally, ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND
REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (Aspen Publishers, 2001).
290. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
291. The source of this observation is Professor Margaret Chon of the Seattle University
School of Law. She noticed the usage of the name and included it in her keynote address during the
inauguration of the Fred. T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality at the Seattle University School of
Law, April 18, 2009.
292. Military Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command
of the U.S. Army directed that all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from certain areas.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
293. Id. at 221.
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ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalt9 and good disposition
towards the United States" violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument on the grounds that the measure was based on national
security and wartime exigencies not racial prejudice or animus.295 Interestingly,
296
although this was a race-based classification subject to strict scrutiny, the Court
deferred to the decision of the military authorities in a language reminiscent of the
Chinese Exclusion decision of 1889. It reads:
He [Korematsu] was excluded because we are at war with the
Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military
authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided
that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens
of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast
temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence
in this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-
determined that they should have the power to do just this."'
The justification for this rule, just like the Chinese Exclusion case, seems to be
predicated on the perpetual "alienage" status of a certain segment of the society,
supporting the suggestion that in reality the alienage spectrum does not end where it
should. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy said, "such exclusion goes over
298
'the very brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.
Korematsu challenges the genuineness and legitimacy of the military official's
assessment of risk and loyalty and attributes the measures to racial animus. To
support his allegation he cites to the Commanding General's Final Report in which
he labeled all persons of "Japanese descent as 'subversive,' as belonging to 'an
enemy race' whose 'racial strains are undiluted,' and as constituting 'over 112,000
potential enemies at large today."' 299 Additionally, Justice Murphy also noted that
when testifying before the House Naval Affairs Committee the same General said
that "[i]t makes no difference whether he [the person with Japanese ancestry] is an
American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does not necessarily
determine loyalty. But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is
wiped off the map." 300  Commenting on these issues Professor Robert Chang
explained: "World War 1I taught us the tragic lesson that even citizenship was not
enough. The Nisei second generation Japanese Americans and United States citizens
by birth were denied their place in the national community."
301
A related issue arose more than half a century later in the context of the
294. Id. at 223.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 219-220 (recognizing that "[clompulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from
their homes would be inconsistent with the Constitution unless "in times of direct emergency").
297. Id. at 223.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 236.
300. Id. at 236, n. 12.
301. ROBERT S. CHANG, A MEDIATION ON BORDERS, IN IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW
NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES, 244, 247 (Juan F. Perea ed.,
1997).
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"4war on terror." Although in Rumsfeld v. Padilla302 the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to determine the extent of the President's power relating to the military
detention of U.S. citizens suspected of being "enemy combatants," the Court refused
to address the issue and focused instead on jurisdictional issues.303 Padilla, a U.S.
citizen, was detained at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago on his way back
from Pakistan on allegations of being an enemy combatant.30 The President claimed
constitutional and statutory power to militarily detain him.305  If the Court had
chosen to address the merits of the case, perhaps one of the most appropriate
precedents would have been Korematsu, but it chose not to rely on that precedent.
Despite the Supreme Court's unwillingness to resurrect Korematsu on the
basis of the "war on terror" following 9/11, Korematsu-type administrative measures
have targeted certain segments of society based on their perceived "alienage status."
The use of ethnicity, religion, and country of origin as proxies for determining the
loyalty and perhaps the position of the individuals or the groups on the alienage and
citizenship spectra is not a new phenomenon. Commenting on the administrative
measures that the federal government took against persons of Middle Eastern origin
following 9/11, Professor Susan Akram and Dean Kevin Johnson said that these
measures "reinforce deeply-held negative stereotypes - foreignness and possibly
disloyalty - about Arabs and Muslims., 306 In accord, Professor Victor Romero also
notes that "stereotypes of foreignness seem to follow racial patterns: Latinas and
Asians are perpetually foreign; European and African Americans are not."307
Professor Robert Chang neatly summarizes the phenomenon in these terms: "We are
left with people who live in transit, between their imaginary homeland and mythic
America."308  Unfortunately, these stereotypes are not purely sociological
phenomena; they have constantly underminned legislative and administrative actions
as well as judicial opinions and policies that contribute to the existing disorder in
the alienage spectrum. The following part will provide a more detailed discussion of
the sources of the disorder.
III. THE SOURCES OF THE DISORDER
Complex combinations of historical, political, social, and cultural
circumstances have in one way or another contributed to the existing disorder in the
alienage spectrum discussed in Part II above. However, the scope of this section is
limited to the factors that most immediately influenced the jurisprudence that led to
the disorder. Like many things in life, decisions affecting aliens are products of a
tug-of-war between well-intentioned and not so well intentioned actors. Oppressive
302. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 430-431.
305. Id.
306. ROMERO at 29 (quoting Susan Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and
Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Muslims and Arabs, 58 NYU Annual
Survey of American Law 295, 331 (2002)).
307. See ROMERO, supra note 141, at 29.
308. CHANG, supra note 301, at 251.
309. For a comprehensive treatment of the social hierarchy and conceptions of foreignness as
underpinnings of immigration law and policy over the ages, see KEVIN JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED
MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2003).
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laws are often made when people in positions of power are inclined to restrict others'
rights prevail and vice versa. These historical incidents often select the winning side,
causing a back and forth movement, which in turn makes a disordered jurisprudence
possible. This has been noted in almost all judicial and political decisions affecting
the rights of aliens throughout history. Alienage as a distinct and inferior legal status
often serves as an excuse for the enactment and implementation of discriminatory
laws. As a maturing society's tolerance for discrimination diminishes in all other
areas, using alienage as a justification for discriminatory measures inevitably faces
serious resistance from a number of directions. An attempt to remedy the glaring
inconsistency between the alienage jurisprudence predicated on the principle of
unequal rights with the maturing due process jurisprudence in all other areas
unavoidably leads to an inconsistent and disordered jurisprudence. This section
critically examines the most important and most immediately relevant legislative and
judicial decisions of the last century and a half in an attempt to highlight the source
of the disorder and set the stage for the observations in Part IV. This section is
310
organized chronologically by different jurisprudential eras.
a. The Ping Era
The Ping era saw a litany of unfortunate Supreme Court decisions that
have had an enduring jurisprudential impact. A close examination of Ping suggests
that it is in fact a continuation of the Dred Scott v. Sanford 12 era. The operative
language of the two decisions is strikingly similar. In denying freedom to a runaway
slave in Dred Scott the Supreme Court gave the following opinion:
The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe
the political body who, according to our republican institutions,
form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the
Government through their representatives. They are what we
familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of
this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The
question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the
plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are
constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not,
and that they are not included, and were not intended to be
included, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United
States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated
by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges
but such as those who held the power and the Government might
310. By using the term "era" the author refers to a period of time within a reasonable range
before and after a landmark legislation or Supreme Court decision. Some of these eras may not be well
recognized in the way the author uses them and merely represent the author's own assessment.
311. Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
312. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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choose to grant them. It is not the province of the court to decide
upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws.
The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-
making power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed
the Constitution. The duty of the court is, to interpret the
instrument they have framed, with the best lights we can obtain on
the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its true
intent and meaning when it was adopted.313
Once Dred Scott unequivocally confirmed that freed slaves were not U.S.
citizens, politicians, including President Lincoln, seriously considered the idea of
deporting former slaves to Africa or elsewhere in South and Central America.314
Professor Daniel Kanstroom suggests that Lincoln had early on linked emancipation
with removal and quotes Lincoln's 1854 speech, "I should not know what to do ....
My first impulse would be to free all the slaves and send them to Liberia, to their
own native land."315 He supported that idea because he noted that "there [was] a
natural disgust in the minds of nearly all whit people with the idea of indiscriminate
amalgamation of the white and black races,"3  and that the only way to make sure
that such amalgamation did not happen was to deport the black race. Although the
deportation plan gained enormous support, including appropriation of significant
amounts of money by Congress, by 1864 it became clear that it was not a workable
plan.318 Ironically, the implementation of the plan to remove millions of persons of
African descent required immigrant labor and, as Professor Kanstroom puts it, "as
thousands of laborers arrived from China, the conceptual matrices of the Fugitive
319 320 ,321
Slave Laws and colonization plans awaited them." The clearest expression of
this is found in Ping.
In Ping, the Supreme Court affirmed the arbitrary exclusion of persons of
Chinese origin on the basis of their race. In doing so, it crafted the "Dred Scott-
,,322
type, and enduring plenary power doctrine in the following terms:
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its
legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a
313. Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
314. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
86 (2007). This plan was not new in 1854; it was entertained as early as 1714 in different forms. See id.
at 84.
315. THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 2, 255-56 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953)
(cited in KANSTROOM supra note 314, at 86.).
316. Id. at 405, 408-09.
317. See KANSTROOM, supra note 314, at 86.
318. See id. at 86-90.
319. Professor Kanstroom notes that the Fugitive Slave Laws were products of compromise
when making the Constitution. See id. Kanstroom describes the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act as "a federal
law that forced movement of people on the basis of their legal status and their race." Id. at 77. He then
analogizes the lack of due process rights held by the targets of the Fugitive Slave Act with people in
deportation proceedings. See id. at 81-82.
320. Colonization refers to the resettlement of former slaves in new lands creating black
colonies. Id. at 83-90.
321. Id. at 90.
322. This expression is borrowed from Professor Richard Delgado's usage in his piece
"Citizenship." See RICHARD DELGADO, CITIZENSHIP, in Immigrants Out! The New Nativisim and the
Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States 322 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
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different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be
dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be
stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the
nation of which the foreigners are subjects. The existence of war
would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious
and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may
arise when war does not exist, and the same authority which
adjudges the necessity in one case must also determine it in the
other. In both cases its determination is conclusive upon the
. . 323judiciary.
The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment necessitated a repackaging of Dred Scott
into Plessy v. Ferguson324 until Brown v. Board ofEducation subsequently overruled
it.325 No similar measures ameliorated the vestiges of Ping in the jurisprudence of
alienage. In fact, Professor Richard Delgado even sees the "overtones of Dred Scott
reasoning" in "the argument, structure, and rhetoric" of some of today's approaches,
particularly the movement to limit the Fourteenth Amendment's grant of birthright
citizenship to all born in the United States.3 26
The consistent use of the Dred Scott-type reasoning would not have resulted
in the kind of alienage spectrum disorder that we see now. For every Dred Scott
reasoning, there has almost always been a powerful, but often losing Brown-type
reasoning. On the few occasions that the Brown-type prevailed, it made the full-
scale implementation of Ping difficult. This is illustrated in the Ping era's Yick Wo
v. Hopkins.327 In Yick Wo, a facially neutral city ordinance regulating the operation
of laundries granted arbitrary power to city officials to grant variance. The
exercise of this arbitrary power resulted in an undisputed discriminatory impact
affecting only Chinese operators.329 In holding that the implementation of the
ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court observed that:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the Constitution.3 3 0
Having noted that while no Chinese immigrants out of two hundred applicants were
allowed the variance that would have enabled them to operate their laundries, eighty
non-Chinese were allowed to do so, the Court concluded that:
The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is
323. Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
324. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (affirming the "separate but equal" principle).
325. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy).
326. DELGADO at 322; see generally Kevin Johnson, Race, The Immigration Laws, and
Domestic Race Relations: "A Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. II1I (1998)
(linking the function of race in the immigration context to domestic race relations).
327. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
328. See id. at 374.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 373-74.
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shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it
exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the
petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not justified.
The discrimination is, therefore, illegal, and the public
administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection
of the laws and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.'33
The Yick Wo Court condemned the race neutral, yet discriminatory
ordinance with strong language. Although Yick Wo and Ping dealt with different
aspects of the regulation of aliens, the Court's general attitude reflected in these two
decisions makes it almost impossible to believe that Ping was decided only three
years after Yick Wo. Justice Field, who authored the Ping opinion, had actually
joined Justice Matthews's opinion in Yick Wo. More notably, just four years after he
authored the Ping opinion, Field dissented in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.332
Ting extended the Ping principle to the deportation of aliens who had already
entered, as opposed to those who were on the verge of entry. 333 Although Justice
Field's positions in the two cases could be reconciled by applying a classic spectrum
argument, it is almost impossible to reconcile the philosophical underpinnings of the
two opinions. Aside from the clever legal arguments, Ping, just like Yick Wo and
Ting, is principally a race-based exclusion. To add to the confusion, Justice Field
actually joined the Court's opinion in Plessy, decided three years after Ting. At the
most practical level, Justice Field's inconsistent positions in Ping and Plessy on the
one hand, and Yick Wo and Ting on the other, are indicative of the discomfort that
arises in enabling the deprivation of rights and privileges on the basis of race. His
individual dilemma is exactly the same as the national dilemma that leads to
inconsistent and even conflicting laws and policies, which in turn lead to disorder in
331. Id. at 374.
332. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
333. See id. at 745. Compare Ting, 149 U.S. 698, 753-54 (1893) and Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
Note the difference between Justice Field's Ting dissent and his Ping opinion:
This object being constitutional, the only question for our consideration is the
lawfulness of the procedure provided for its accomplishment, and this must be
tested by the provisions of the Constitution and laws intended for the protection of
all persons against encroachment upon their rights. Aliens from countries at peace
with us, domiciled within our country by its consent, are entitled to all the
guaranties for the protection of their persons and property, which are secured to
native-born citizens. The moment any human being from a country at peace with us
comes within the jurisdiction of the United States, with their consent - and such
consent will always be implied when not expressly withheld, and, in the case of the
Chinese laborers before us, was, in terms, given by the treaty referred to - he
becomes subject to all their laws, is amenable to their punishment, and entitled to
their protection. Arbitrary and despotic power can no more be exercised over them,
with reference to their persons and property, than over the persons and property of
native-born citizens. They differ only from citizens in that they cannot vote or hold
any public office. As men having our common humanity, they are protected by all
the guaranties of the Constitution. To hold that they are subject to any different law,
or are less protected in any particular, than other person is, in my judgment, to
ignore the teachings of our history, the practice of our Government, and the
language of our Constitution. Id. at 753-54.
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the alienage jurisprudence.
b. The Quota Era
The Ping era was followed by a national origin quota system. There is no
disagreement that the quota system was designed to be an instrument of racial and
ethnic selection.334 The concept of limiting immigration b assigning specific quotas
to various regions was first temporarily instituted in 1921. Aside from completely
banning Japanese immigration, the Act limited immigration from Europe to 150,000
while exempting the Western Hampshire from the quotas.336 The allocation of
European visas was designed to disfavor migration from Eastern and Southern
Europe. 33 7 One year after the institution of the quota system, the Commission of
Immigration reported that "virtually all immigrants now 'looked' exactly like
Americans" 3 3 8 The quota system, made permanent in 1924, remained in effect until
it was replaced by the existing race neutral system of preference in 1965. 33
The quota era unequivocally affirmed the underlying Dred Scott - Ping
notion of citizenship and American identity. Korematsu, decided in the quota era,
confirms this more than the legislative action itself. As Justice Murphy wrote in his
dissent, the forced internment of about 120,000 persons of Japanese descent, most of
whom were natural born citizens, embodied "one of the most sweeping and complete
deprivation of constitutional rights in the history of this nation." 340 The U.S. citizens
in Korematsu were seen as enemy aliens, thus linking the alienage and citizenship
spectra. As Professor David Cole, writing in the context of the "war on terror,"
explains, "[t]he close interrelationship between anti-Asian racism and anti-immigrant
sentiment made the transition from 'enemy alien' to 'enemy race' a disturbingly
smooth one." 341 As will be discussed in the Guantanamo era section below, recent
government actions attempted to reaffirm the Korematsu-type reasoning, but the
Supreme Court rejected almost every effort. The Court gradually consolidated the
substantial shift in the fundamental assumptions that underpinned the previous eras.
c. The Civil Rights Era
Despite the vigorous dissents and serious political opposition that supplied
powerful ammunition for the changes that would come later, the Ping and Quota eras
did not see a concrete shift in policy or philosophy. However, a notable change
came in 1965, when Congress reversed the quota system and overhauled the entire
334. See LAWRENCE H. FUCHS & SUSAN FORBES MARTIN, IMMIGRATION AND U.S. HISTORY - THE
EVOLUTION OF OPEN SOCIETY, (1981), excerpted in THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID MARTIN &
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, 155-63 (5th ed. 2003).
335. Id. at 158.
336. Id. at 158-59.
337. See id. at 157-58. For example, the use of the 1890 census reduced Italian quotas from
42,000 to about 4,000, the Polish quota from 31,000 to 6,000, and the Greek quota from 3,000 to 100. Id.
at 158. In some comers it was believed that "post war immigration was composed of largely Jews, who
were 'filthy, un-American, and often dangerous in their habits[.].' Id. at 157.
338. Id. at 159.
339. Id. at 162-63.
340. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
341. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 992 (2002).
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immigration system.342 The bill that eventually became the 1965 law343 was
introduced by President Kennedy, who wrote a book when he was a senator
condemning the quota system, and was passed during the presidency of Lyndon
Johnson; yet, the initiative dates back to the time of Truman, who in 1952
commissioned a group of experts to evaluate the immigration policies of the day.344
This commission issued its report at the beginning of 1953 and concluded that,
among other things, the immigration laws violated "fundamental American traditions
and ideals, display[ed] a lack of faith in America's future, damage[d] American
prestige and position among other nations, [and] ignore[d] the lessons of the
American way of life," and recommended that it be "completely rewritten." 34 5 This
conflict between espoused American ideals and the implementation of almost
outrageously discriminatory laws and policies contributed to the existing disorder.
And yet, despite the age-old and enduring implementation of these discriminatory
policies, certain segments of society do not consider them core American values.
The Truman Commission's expression is exemplary. By the time the Commission
issued its report in 1953, the systematic policy of racial and ethnic exclusion was
almost a century old. Yet, members of the Commission did not consider the laws
that implemented those policies part of the American tradition. In their own words,
those laws in fact "flout fundamental American traditions and ideals, [and] display a
lack of faith in America."
346
The aspirations often claimed as being traditions and ideals eventually
gained expression in the laws. The 1965 immigration statute is one such example. It
eventually claimed a position in the ranks of the civil rights era laws. As the spirit of
the civil rights era was gradually replaced with unforeseen and unintended
immigration patterns, policy makers started thinking of revisiting their civil rights
era wisdom. Perhaps the most notable problem involved immigrants from the
Western Hemisphere who had enjoyed unlimited access under the quota system.347
In fact, it is argued that the elimination of the quota system in 1965 gained enormous
support in part because it purported to put a limit to the increasing number of Latin
American immigrants who were benefiting from the Western Hemisphere
exemption.348 There is much disagreement on the impact of the 1965 abolition of the
quota system; however, it is clear that it complicated immigration from Central and
South America. Although theoretically exempt from the quota system, it is clear that
they had nevertheless been subject to several restrictions. Pre-existing restrictions
coupled with the new quota system contributed to the remarkable increase in the
undocumented population from the Americas, particularly from Mexico, and created
342. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 334, at 162.
343. The law is called the Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965, and has been amended
several times since then.
344. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 334, at 162. See also generally, Gabriel J. Chin, The
Civil Rights Revolution Comes to immigration Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1965, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 273 (1996) (detailing the racial diversity that followed the enactment of the 1965
Immigration Act.)
345. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 334 at 162.
346. See id.
347. See id. at 164.
348. See id. at 163.
349. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, The Legal Mapping of U.S. Immigration, 1965-1996, in Louts
MENDOZA & S. SHANKAR, CROSSING INTO AMERICA, 259 (2003).
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a new set of issues while reinvigorating old debates.
d. The New Immigrants Era
Most of the immigrants that came to the United States after the elimination
of the old quota system in 1965 have been persons of color.350 These new
immigrants reinvigorated the old debate about immigration. It challenged America's
aspirations, often called traditions and values, in many ways. The old tug-of-war
between aspirations of equality, non-discrimination, tolerance, civility, and civil
rights on the one hand, and bigotry, exclusion, and racism on the other, found a new
battleground. The result was a back and forth movement and a disordered
jurisprudence. This section explains this disorder in some detail.
One of the lesser-known aspects of the 1965 law is that it actually contained
provisions for the admission of limited categories of refugees.351 The comprehensive
Refugee Act of 1980 replaced the 1965 provisions.352 This Act brought the United
States into compliance with the 1967 U.N. Protocol on the Status of Refugees, which
it had previously ratified.35 3 Although this implementation was later criticized, 354 the
Act began the decade with a vigorous humanitarian tone.
The implementation of the new 1965 quota system imposed numerical
limitations on all prospective immigrants, particularly those in the Western
Hemisphere who were exempt from earlier quotas. It also introduced the enduring
problem of a gradual accumulation of undocumented migrants. By 1986, millions of
workers from all over the world lacked legal immigration status. That year, after a
very difficult debate, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act
315
(IRCA). IRCA was a compromise that provided legal status to undocumented
356
migrants who could establish physical presence for about four years, and also
contained provisions imposing civil as well as criminal penalties against employers
who knowingly hire unauthorized persons. The compromise that gave IRCA its
350. See Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, Something
Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT
IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 169 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) (relying on NARRY EDMONDSON AND
JEFFREY S. PASSEL, EDS, IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY: THE INTEGRATION OF AMERICA'S NEWEST
ARRIVALS (1994)). For example, the number of immigrants from Asia between 1951 and 1965 was
154,000. Between 1981-90, that number rose to about 2.7 million. Similarly the number of Mexicans who
immigrated lawfully between 1951 and 1965 was 300,000. From 1981-1990 that number rose to about 1.6
million, almost I million of who immigrated in the year 1990 alone. See Johnson (citing U.S. Department
of Justice Statistics).
351. See KANSTROOM, (noting it allowed the admission of refugees from communist nations
and the general area of the Middle East. It, however, subjected its implementation to administrative parole
power.).
352. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (amending various sections of the INA).
353. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267. See also generally I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (suggesting that the Act
brought the U.S. into compliance with the U.N. Refugee Protocol). ,
354. See, e.g., Davalene Cooper, Promised Land or Land of Broken Promises? Political
Asylum in the United States, 76 KY. L.J. 923 (1988) (suggesting that the admission process is influenced
by ideological rather than humanitarian considerations).
355. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (amending various sections of the INA).
356. See INA sec. 245A(a)(2)(A)&(B). Agricultural workers were exempt from the residence
requirement as long as they proved the performance of seasonal agricultural work for 90 man-hours. See
INA sec. 210(a)(1)(B).
357. See INA sec. 274A(a)-(h).
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final shape is an excellent example of the age-old tug-of-war between the two camps,
Ping and Yick Wo, discussed above. In an article written shortly after the passage
of the Act, Professor Linda Bosniak359 explained the debate between the two sides as
follows:
Supporters of increased restrictionist measures viewed opponents
alternatively as dangerously naive bleeding-heart liberals, as
opportunistic exploiters of cheap labor and vulnerable labor, or as
supporters of Third World revolution at home and abroad.
Opponents accused supporters of xenophobic racism, of
convenient scapegoating of a defenseless population for the
society's economic and social ills, and paving the way for the rise
360of a 'big Brother' state.
Eventually, the opposin camps supported the bill because it contained some of the
measures they wanted. For the restrictionists it contained employer sanctions and
limited the scope of the amnesty to only those who could show four years of
residence and for supporters of immigration, although unsatisfacto7, it contained
some amnesty and employment-based anti-discrimination provisions.
That same year, concerned about the supposed high rate of acquisition of
lawful immigration status on the basis of fraudulent marriages, Congress enacted the
Immigration Marriage Amendments Act. Although, ironically, the passage of the
Act itself was predicated on fraudulent data supplied by the Immigration Service to
Congress,36 this Act continues to complicate the adjudication of family-based
petitions to this date.365
The 1990s also saw significant immigration reforms. Just like the previous
decades, the balance was clearly towards the restriction side. The decade began with
358. Although the two cases represented different aspects of the conditions of aliens (Ping -
federal admission/ exclusion law, but Yick Wo - state alienage law), the underlying philosophical
backgrounds largely remain the same. Aside from occasional shift in opinion, as in Justice Field's change
of position in Ping on the one hand and Ting and Yick Wo on the other, it is not difficult to discern a clear
pattern of decisions as being for or against the immigrant.
359. Bosniak was then a law clerk for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (1988).
360. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 958 (1988) (citing G. STACY & W. LITTON,
THE IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB (1985) and R. LAMB & G. INHOFE, IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB 226027
(1985) (noting the arguments made by the restrictionists), and citing National Network for Immigrants and
Refugees Monthly Newsletter, Oct. 1987, at 2 (noting the argument made by the opponents)). (Other
footnotes omitted).
361. Seeid.
362. See id. at 258-59. IRCA's anti-discrimination provision is contained in sec. 274B of the
INA.
363. Pub. L No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537 (1986) (amending INA sec. 216).
364. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 271 (4th ed.
2004). In his testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, the then I.N.S. Commissioner, Alan
Nelson, said that the former I.N.S. believed that as much as thirty percent of marriages were fraudulent. It
was later discovered that the I.N.S. study was flawed in many respects. For on thing the study focused on
suspicious cases by excluding marriages that contained certain indicia of reliability. Moreover, the thirty
percent figure, reported as a fact, was based on the investigators' "suspicion" rather than a factual
conclusion. See id. at 271-72.
365. The main operative provision that this Act added was the requirement of subjecting the
residence permit acquired through marriage to a two year waiting period and some serious conditions
subsequent. See INA sec. 216 (introducing an elaborate set of conditions for permanent residence).
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the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, which was a relatively major
overhaul of the immigration system. While on the one hand the Act's "Diversity
Visa" created a very useful and new avenue of eligibility for permanent residence for
underrepresented countries;367 on the other hand, the Act significantly expanded the
368
grounds for exclusion and deportation. In 1996 Congress further expanded the
grounds for exclusion and deportation by passing two almost revolutionary acts: the
Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)369 and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 370  The IIRIRA
introduced the concept of admission, which adopted a legal fiction separate from
physical entry and presence. It defined admission or admitted to mean "the lawful
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer. This notion immensely complicated the alienage spectrum
and led to a disordered jurisprudence because it did not allow an un-inspected entrant
who had lived here for decades, regardless of his age during entry, to be considered
as admitted. Moreover, he would be barred from almost all forms of relief from
deportation. This law is even more severe because it prohibits adjustment of status
even if an unauthorized entrant came at age one and subsequently married a United
States citizen.372 By contrast, a diversity visa winner could acquire citizenship
within five years. This undermines the notion of attachment to the community as a
basis for the granting or recognition of rights.
In addition, the 1996 twin laws reformulated the entire exclusion and
deportation system. For example, AEDPA added more crimes to the list of
deportable offenses, introduced an extremely expansive meaning of terrorism,
enhanced law enforcement, and set up the so-called criminal alien identification
system.373 IIRIRA, besides introducing the concept of admission, also significantly
expanded grounds for deportation by adding to the list aggravated felonies 374 for
which there is no relief from deportation.375
366. Immigration Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (amending various
sections of the INA).
367. See INA sec. 203(c) as enacted by sec. 131 of the Immigration Act of 1990. Dean Kevin
Johnson says that this visa category is "ironically named" because it was principally designed to
encourage European immigration because it purports to benefit those who are underrepresented in recent
immigration patterns. See Johnson, supra note 344, at 174. Although Dean Johnson's observations seem
correct, it is undeniable that Africans have also been the primary beneficiaries of the diversity visa
program. In fact, in recent decades, the diversity visa program was the main path for African immigration.
368. See, e.g., INA sec. 212(a)(6)(C) (making seeking the procurement of a visa through
misrepresentation grounds for inadmissibility).
369. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending various sections of the INA).
370. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (amending various sections of INA).
371. See INA sec. 101(a)(13) as amended by sec. 301 of IIRAIRA.
372. See INA sec. 245(a). INS sec. 245(i) had provided relief for these kinds of entrants but it
was short lived and has never been renewed since it lapsed on April 30, 2001.
373. See AEDPA secs. 323, 435, 440.
374. See IIRIRA sec. 321 (amending INA sec. 101(a)(43)). The existing Jist could be
interpreted to include shoplifting for which a suspended sentence of one year is given. See INA
101(a)(43)(G) ("a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the
term of imprisonment is at least one year.") added by sec. 321(a)(3) of IIRIRA. The suspension of the
sentence does not make a difference. See INA sec. 101(a)(48)(B). The concept of aggravated felony as a
deportable offense was introduced by the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181
(1988). This Act limited the list of these offenses to most serious crimes such as murder, and trafficking
in drugs and firearms. See id.
375. See, e.g., INA 245(a) (prohibiting adjustment of status), see also 240A (prohibiting
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Another testament to the perception of the position of immigrants in the
U.S. that prevailed in the 1990s is the inclusion of provisions that deprived welfare
benefits to lawful residents in the comprehensive welfare reform law.3 Its
deprivation went as far as to deny food stamps to lawful residents who resided in the
U.S. for less than five years. In Mathews v. Diaz, decided in 1976, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of this kind of deprivation.3 7 8  While Mathews
recognized that the Fifth Amendment protected aliens from invidious discrimination,
it upheld the federal government's power to distinguish between lawful resident
aliens and citizens on the basis of the length of their stay for purposes of public
benefits.3 79 Mathews is a classic spectrum case.
Just like the statutory developments discussed at some length above,
judicial decisions were also mixed. A few years after the Court in Mathews opened
the door for clear discrimination on the basis of alienage by applying what looked
like a rational basis test, the Court in Plyler v. Doe applied an intermediate
scrutiny-like test to strike down a Texas law that prohibited children of
undocumented migrants from attending public schools.3 8 1 Mathews and Plyler seem
to mirror Ping and Yick Wo respectively.
e. The Guantanamo Era
The jurisprudence relating to the rights and conditions of aliens has never
been as complex as in the Guantanamo era. Professor David Cole begins his book,
Enemy Aliens, with a powerful observation. He recalls what Ari Fleischer, President
Bush's Press Secretary, said when the first "American Taliban," California resident
John Walker Lindh, was captured by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan and transferred
back to the U.S., "The great strength of America is he will now have his day in
court." Professor Cole notes that Lindh "was represented by one of the nation's
premier defense attorneys," and that he faced a very favorable outcome because the
382main charge against him was dropped. He contrasts this case with the
administration's response in Hamdi and Padilla, where both plaintiffs were U.S.
citizens, and warns that "[tihe transition from denying the rights of enemy aliens to
infringing those of American citizens was unusually swift with Hamdi and
Padilla .... [b]ut history suggests that the transition is virtually inevitable, and that
in the long term, the rights of all of us are in the balance when the government
selectively sacrifices foreign nationals' liberties." 83
Legislative actions were also swift and some of them draconian. The most
cancelation of removal for aggravated felony conviction); see also INA sec. 208(b)(2)(B) (prohibiting
asylum).
376. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
377. See id.
378. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
379. See id. at 77-90. The Court had stricken down a similar state law a few years earlier
applying strict scrutiny. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But see, Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 643 (1073) (carving out a political participation exception).
380. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
381. Seeid.at210.
382. See Cole, supra note 341, at 1.
383. Id. at 5.
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notable and relevant ones are the Patriot Act of 2001384 and the Real ID Act of
2005.385 These Acts made some revisions to the existing law relating mainly to
terrorism386 and significantly expanded the Attorney General's authority to arrest,
detain, and deport immigrants. The use of these laws, particularly the Patriot Act,
resulted in the detention and deportation of thousands of Arabs and Muslims,
virtually all of whom had nothing to do with terrorism.387
Perhaps the most interesting role in the Guantanamo era was played not by
the political branches but by the judicial branch. The Supreme Court took particular
interest in the way the political branches responded to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
The Court's response was more active and perhaps unprecedented. It struck down
almost every effort by the executive to undermine the rights of aliens in its custody.
The most notable cases are discussed in section II above. However, to conclude this
section, it is important to highlight the gist of the jurisprudence that emerged from
these Guantanamo cases because they have the potential for fundamentally reshaping
the constitutional jurisprudence pertaining to alienage.
This does not mean that the Post-9/11 alienage jurisprudence was entirely
consistent and moved in one direction only. Just like the previous era, it had its own
conflicts. The discussion may rightfully begin with the landmark case of Zadvydas
v. Davis, which coincidentally was decided less than three months before 9/11. In
Zadvydas, per Justice Stevens, the Court held that the plenary power is subject to
"important constitutional limitations," and that indefinite detention is not
permissible, at least as it is imposed on certain categories of aliens.389 Following this
decision, scholars speculated as to what it meant for the plenary power doctrine.390
Two 3ears later the same issue arose again with a slight variation in Demare v.
Kim. Per Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that a categorical preventive detention
during immigration removal proceedings is constitutional even if the particular
384. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
385. Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for the Defense, the Global War on Terror,
and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
386. For a discussion of the impact of these laws see Won Kidane, The Terrorism Exception
to Asylum: Managing the Uncertainty in Status Determination, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 669, 676-77
(2007).
387. See Cole, supra note 341, at 188-89 (noting that only three of the 1,200 suspected
terrorist and none of the 4,000 more immigrants detained warranted even a charge of terrorism).
388. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
389. Id. at 695.
390. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining the Plenary Power: The Meaning and
Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 386 (2002) (predicting that it probably won't
have a significant impact on the plenary power doctrine) ("Zadvydas, then, is a conundrum. It is a
doctrinal muddle, yet it kindles the possibility of a dramatic shift in constitutional norms in the
immigration field. It purports to put an end to indefinite detention, yet it supplies grounds to the Executive
Branch and Congress to mandate indefinite detention. It reaches out to produce a just result, yet it appears
to embrace one of the Court's least just immigration decisions. The problem here is not so much the
Court's opinion; it is the damage that the plenary power doctrine has done to immigration law for more
than a century. Constitutional norms have not been able to evolve over time, reflecting and influencing
developments in other areas of constitutional law. So we have awkward, surprising, interventions from
time to time - decisions that bring even further incoherence to the field. Thus, in Zadvydas, we are given
no satisfactory grounds for the continuing validity of Mezei or for the "terrorist exception." Both will
supply doctrinal fodder for the newly adopted policies that restrict the rights and freedoms of non-citizens
and citizens - and this from an opinion that strikes a hard blow for individual liberty!").
391. Demare v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
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individual poses no flight or security risk.392 Of course, 9/11 punctuated these two
decisions.
In the subsequent years, significant Guantanamo cases followed. None of
them matched Kim in their treatment of aliens. Instead, they were all more closely
aligned with Zadvydas. The first of the Guantanamo cases, Rasul, struck down the
executive's effort to indefinitely detain aliens in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Court
held that the Constitution prohibited such indefinite detention of aliens without due
process, noting that the right to habeas corpus extended to "all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or any
treaty of the United States." 393 Although Rasul demanded some due process for alien
detainees, it did not clarify the exact nature of the due process that was owed to
them. Subsequent cases articulated the exact nature of the acceptable due process.
In Hamdan, the Court held that the executive's attempt to use a military commission
with questionable procedural safeguards was inadequate. 394  Neither Rasul nor
Hamdan answered the more fundamental question of whether aliens detained by
United States authorities outside of the United States have a constitutional right to
habeas corpus. Boumediene v. Bush answered this question in the affirmative.
Boumediene is by far the most important of all the Guantanamo cases and is
likely to have more far reaching consequences than any other Guantanamo case.
First, it is fair to say that no case has ever undermined the plenary power doctrine,
introduced by Ping, as has Boumediene. The Court's response to the plenary power
argument was unequivocal and categorical. It said:
Abstaining from questions involving formal sovereignty and
territorial governance is one thing. To hold the political branches
have the power to switch the Constitution on and off at will quite
another. The former position reflects this Court's recognition that
certain matters requiring political judgments are best left to the
political branches. The latter would permit a striking anomaly in
our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which
Congress and the President, not the Court, say "what the law is."3 96
What does the Court cite to? Marbury v. Madison!397 It is almost unbelievable to
see Marbury v. Madison approvingly cited in a case involving the rights of aliens.
Contrasting this language with the Ping operative language could be instructive. In
Ping, the Court held:
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its
legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a
different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be
dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be
stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the
nation of which the foreigners are subjects. The existence of war
392. The vote was largely on ideological lines with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Souter dissenting on the essential ruling. Id.
393. Rasul, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
394. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
395. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244-52 (2008).
396. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.
397. Marbury, I Cranch 137, 177, 2 1. ED. 60 (1803) (cited in id).
[Vol. 20142
HeinOnline  -- 20 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 142 2010
THE ALIENAGE SPECTRUM DISORDER
would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious
and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may
arise when war does not exist, and the same authority which
adjudges the necessity in one case must also determine it in the
other. In both cases its determination is conclusive upon the
judiciary.398
It is difficult to believe that these two passages, from the same Court, could co-exist.
Second, yet another way that Boumediene undermined Ping was by
reducing the Eisentrager alienage factors into a "functional test," as Justice Scalia
rightfully suggests.3 9 9 This "functional test" looks very much like the Mathews v.
400
Eldridge balancing test.
Third, the Court examined the procedures set up by Congress at the request
of the executive very closely and found them inadequate, and it struck them down as
an unconstitutional suspension of the Great Writ. This is also almost unprecedented
in the jurisprudence of alienage. Again, comparing this with Ekiu, one of the Ping
era procedural due process cases is instructive. In Ekiu the Court held:
It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners
who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or
residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the
country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in opposition
to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and
executive branches of the national government. As to such
persons, the decisions of executive or administrative officers,
acting within owers expressly conferred by congress, are due
process of law.
Fourth, in Boumediene, Chief Justice Roberts correctly observes that the
Court expands aliens' rights beyond what it actually recognized for U.S. citizens in
Hamdi. In Hamdi, the Court said that a duly constituted military commission
might be sufficient. It also added that hearsay evidence, if that is all the government
has, might suffice.403 Again, as Roberts correctly indicates, Boumediene failed to
recognize those same procedures as adequate substitutes for the constitutional writ of
404
habeas corpus.
Finally, Roberts notes that the procedures the Court considered inadequate,
including the judicial review rules, are exactly the same as the existing rules in the
immigration context. But the Court held that these same rules, including the hearsay
rules, violated the "enemy alien" detainees' rights to constitutional writ of habeas
398. Ping, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
399. See id. at 2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
400. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (establishing a balancing test for the
determination of the nature of procedural due process due in the context of proceedings that are not related
to immigration). But see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1981) (extending Mathews to certain
immigration proceedings).
401. Ekiu, 142 U.S. 660-61 (1892).
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corpus. Chief Justice Roberts' bewilderment, in short, is that now "enemy aliens,"
the worst form of alien that one can be for purposes of constitutional rights, are said
to have rights that aliens within the U.S. and even some U.S. citizens do not have.
Does Boumediene imply that? It most certainly does. This disorders the alienage
spectrum significantly more than ever before by providing aliens at the very
beginning of the spectrum better rights than those at the opposite end. Chief Justice
Roberts' solution to this disorder is to deny rights to the first group to reorder the
spectrum. The suggestion that follows is the opposite: to order the spectrum, which
has always been disordered, by granting the same or better rights to those better
placed on the spectrum. Boumediene must be read in that light. The next section
outlines the merits of this suggestion in more detail.
IV. REORDERING THE SPECTRUM
The disorder in the spectrum is as old as the spectrum itself. As such, it is
chronic. Treating a chronic problem would require addressing the many aspects of
the disorder in a comprehensive manner. This part addresses some of the relevant
and overarching jurisprudential quandaries and attempts to highlight some measures
that would help reorder the disordered spectrum.
a. The Reverence for Ping
In the jurisprudence of aliens, no case seems to be as revered as Ping.405 A
cursory review of Westlaw's case citations shows about 1,968 documents
406
immediately associated with Ping. Virtually all cite Ping with approval. Even in
Zadvydas v. Davis,407 in which the Court seemed to have undermined the central
holdings of Ping by creating an exception to Congress's purported authority to
indefinitely detain aliens ordered removed, it felt compelled to say that it was not
408
dishonoring Ping. The Court noted that it was focusing on the following
limitations: "[C]ongressional authority is limited 'by the Constitution itself and
considerations of public Xolicy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct
of all civilized nations."
A legal doctrine largely meant to exclude Chinese laborers from the West
coast, linked to the social and political realities of the 1880s, became a revered legal
concept vitiating decisions affecting the lives of millions of people over the last
century-and-a-half. Mr. Ping was a day laborer. He probably did not care about
notions of sovereignty and international treaty obligations. For him, the exclusion
was about breaking promises. The Supreme Court's description of the circumstances
of the denial of entry expresses the broken promises very nicely:
On his arrival he presented to the proper custom-house officers his
405. See Ping or Chinese Exclusion case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
406. See Ping, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (looking at Westlaw case citation history).
407. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
408. Id. at 695 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
409. Id. About 15 years ago, Professor Legomsky predicted that, "like old soldiers, the
plenary power doctrine never dies; it just fades away;" See Stephen Legomsky, Ten More years ofPlenary
Power, Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 925, 934-37 (1995) cited in
STEPHEN LEGOMSKY & CHRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION LAW AND REFUGEE POLICY, 244 (5th
ed.).
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certificate and demanded permission to land [in San Francisco].
The collector of the port refused the permit, solely on the ground
that . . the certificate had been annulled, and the right to land
abrogated, and he had been thereby forbidden to enter the United
410
States.
Ping probably could not believe that the people of the United States, collectively
acting through their representatives in Congress, would promise him that he could
return after a short trip to his home country if he took out a certificate only to deny
him entry, having changed the rules while he was away. He found this unjust.
In earnest, Ping was not about sovereignty or international relations. It was
about promises, expectations, justice, and racial exclusion. There is nothing wrong
in letting every nation decide whom to admit or exclude. That is a genuine exercise
of sovereignty. But failing to honor promises is an arbitrary exercise of authority
antithetical to the very notion of civilization that Congress and the Court purported to
protect from "Oriental invasion.",411 However, dishonoring Mr. Ping's certificate of
entry did not challenge Justice Field's sense of justice as did the city of San
Francisco's disallowing of laundry permits to Chinese immigrants or the deportation
of Ting for lack of a white witness. At the risk of over simplification, this was the
reality that originated and sustained the plenary power doctrine.
As indicated in the previous section, the Judiciary's continuous struggle
with this concept has led to the disorder in the alienage spectrum. As such, an effort
to reorder the spectrum must begin by rejecting the plenary power doctrine as it is at
the root of the problem. This doctrine has been subjected to serious criticism over
403
the years. Professor Henkin's statement best summarizes this sentiment:
The doctrine that the Constitution neither limits governmental
control over the admission of aliens nor secures the right of
admitted aliens to reside here emerged in the oppressive shadow of
a racist, nativist mood a hundred years ago. It was reaffirmed
during our fearful, cold war, McCarthy days. It has no foundation
in principle. It is a constitutional fossil, a remnant of a prerights
jurisprudence that we have proudly rejected in other respects.
Nothing in our Constitution, its theory, or history warrants
exemptin any exercise of governmental power from constitutional
restraint.
b. The Current State ofPing: To What Extent Does Boumediene
410. See Ping, 130 U.S. at 623 (emphasis added).
411. Seeid.at626.
412. See Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) (opining that failure
to provide a white witness, the only form of evidence that could be brought to avoid deportation, violated
due process as the respondent had already been a resident).
413. See, e.g. Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV.
965 (1993), Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review
of Federal Alienage Classification After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 76 OR. L. REV. (1997);
Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenge Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border of the
Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS. CONST. L.Q. 1087 (1995).
414. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 860-62 (1987).
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Undermine It?
To what extent does Boumediene undermine Ping? This is a difficult
question, as it would directly ask about the status of the plenary power doctrine after
the Guantanamo cases. Even before that the status of the plenary power doctrine
had been a subject of great controversy. 5 For purposes of the spectrum analysis,
however, the answer depends on the position of the alien on the spectrum. The
previous sections provided a lengthy account of the spectrum. The spectrum ranges
from enemy aliens to natural born citizens with some caveats relating to Korematsu,
Hamdi, and Padilla. As indicated in the previous section, in Boumediene the Court
showed no reverence for Ping. It categorically declared that "enemy aliens" detained
outside the United States are entitled to challenge their combatant status through
constitutional habeas corpus, and that the process Congress accorded them was
inadequate and unconstitutional.416 Boumediene could be reasonably read to provide
the minimum levels of acceptable due process applicable to enemy aliens, who are at
the very beginning of the alienage spectrum. This reading of Boumediene would
indeed reorder the alienage spectrum by providing almost full scale constitutional
protection to all other categories of aliens better positioned on the alienage spectrum
based on the ascending scale of rights analysis. Viewed in this light, Boumediene
might be interpreted to have undermined Ping in at least two important respects: (1)
the decisions of the political branches of government affecting the rights of aliens, in
whatever context, 41 are reviewable by the courts for constitutionality; and (2) as the
protections deemed inadequate for the enemy aliens in Boumediene are similar to
those of lawful permanent residents and citizens like Hamdi in the ordinary operation
of the pre-Boumediene alienage jurisprudence, all non-confirming procedures
affecting non citizens must be upgraded to comply.
Although such reading of Boumediene vis-A-vis the alienage spectrum is not
at all unreasonable, the history of immigration law suggests that it probably will not
enjoy such an expansive interpretation. There are two main reasons. (1)
Boumediene relates to the liberty interest of aliens as opposed to the admission and
exclusion of aliens, which is traditionally the domain of immigration law, while Ping
415. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and
Prediction for Our Strange But Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMGR. L.J. 257
(2000) (arguing that the results arrived at by the Court in most immigration cases could have been arrived
without applying the plenary power doctrine.). For a different view, see, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Race and
Immigration Law Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? 14 Geo. Immigr. L. J.
289 (2000); See also Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a
Plenary Power Doctrine? 14 GEO.IMMIGR. L.J. 307 (2000).
416. This constitutional decision is unique because it is a departure from the Court's usual
ways of relying on statutory grounds. See generally, Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J.
545 (1990) (noting the Court's repeated avoidance of constitutional determinations in favor of statutory
construction).
417. Although the plenary power doctrine originated in the admission and exclusion context,
as discussed in may parts of this article, it gradually pervaded almost every area of law regulating the
conditions of aliens including substantive and procedural due process in non-immigration context, equal
protection including education and public benefits, searches and seizures etc. The justification for every
denial of right by the federal government in all of these contexts has been the plenary power doctrine. As
such, any decision affecting this doctrine in any context must affect its meaning in all other areas as the
Court itself has always made it adoptive.
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in essence relates only to the latter.418 This argument suggests that the Boumediene
Court did not face a Ping problem. In other words, it did not have to release the
Boumediene petitioners into the United States, as they did not seek admission; they
only wanted to go home.419 As convincing as this argument might be, it does not
420 421 422
resolve the Zadvydas and Clark problem.
(2) The Guantanamo cases are quite unique in many ways, including the
special status of the island and the long-term detention of the enemy aliens that the
Court considered excessive. Aside from these considerations, however, there is no
doubt that Boumediene has significantly undermined Ping and added a remarkable
momentum to the movement for the demise of Ping. As such, it will surely remain a
milestone in the jurisprudence of alienage. By noting this reality, the following
subsections provide a more realistic approach to the reordering of the alienage
spectrum disorder.
c. Some Philosophical Hurdles
As indicated earlier, the spectrum approach itself is almost as old as the
423
plenary power doctrine. It is predicated on the assumption that the more people
stay in the country the more social and economic ties they form, and thus, the
decision to sever such ties must not be made as casually as the decision to deny entry
to total strangers. For the purpose of protecting reasonable expectations, it is fair to
say that the spectrum approach is essentially a principle of equity, in the sense of
fairness and justice.
418. Courts have already started making this point. The most notable appeals court case is,
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (2009). In Kiyemba, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
reversed the District Court, which allowed the release of seventeen Chinese citizens who were wrongfully
held at Guantanamo Bay as enemy combatants. See 555 F.3d. at 1023-26. In denying their release into
the United States, the Court distinguished Boumediene by saying that the fact that the Court has habeas
jurisdiction and that it could order their release, does not mean that it has the authority to have them
released into the United States. It added that only the political branches have the authority to do the latter.
If they refuse to do so, the Court must recognize that. See id. at 1028-30. Over a vigorous dissent, it
expressly said that Boumediene is limited to the Suspension Clause. Id. at 1032. In that sense, it is fair to
say that the D.C. Circuit has already indicated that it views Boumediene as a case that carved out a limited
exception to Ping rather than directly contradicting or undermining it. In fact, the court relied on many of
the usual Ping era and Cold War era cases including Ping itself, Ting, Ekiu, Knauff Harisiades, and
Mezei. See id. at. 1025-27, and attempted to diminish the applicability of Zadvydas and Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371 (2005) (extending Zadvydas to excludable aliens.) See 555 F.3d. at 1027-28. This
obviously raises more complicated issues that cannot be fully addressed here and will be a subject of
future writing.
419. Professors Legomsky and Rodriguez suggest that this is perhaps the most convincing of
all arguments distinguishing the Cold War ear indefinite detention cases including Mezei. See LEGOMSKY
& RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY (5 th ed), supra note 364, at 169-171.
420. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 (holding indefinite detention impermissible and allowing the
release of an alien into the United Sates when there is no country that would accept the deportee.)
421. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386-87 (2005).
422. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1037 (2009) (Rogers, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in the judgment)("But the Supreme Court makes clear that a district court has exactly the
power that the majority today finds lacking - the power to order an un admitted alien released into the
United States when detention would otherwise be indefinite.").
423. See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (making a clear distinction of
constitutional significance between newly arriving aliens seeking admission at the ports of entry and those
who had already entered.). See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that a state many
not discriminate against aliens who are already in the country).
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This notion is sometimes characterized in two alternative ways: (1)
"membership in the community" or (2) "community ties." The "membership"
approach is all about the community and not the individual. The community is said
to have the collective right, privilege, and ability to exclude non-members and these
424
non-members must comply with the community's rules and earn their privileges.
The "community ties" approach views the issue differently by focusing on the
individual and the community's considerations of the individual's ties and
expectations. Under this approach, the community's rules are influenced by the
425
reality of the aliens' conditions.
It appears that the alienage jurisprudence began with the "membership
notion" in the exercise of sovereignty emphasized in Ping, and evolved to include
considerations of the alien's community ties in determining the exact nature of the
rights due to him. In fact, community ties are important for many forms of relief
under existing immigration rules.
Professor David Martin, the principal proponent of the notion of a
distinctive "community" populated primarily by citizens, and others with an
ascending scale of rights, proposes that that his recommended alienage spectrum be
utilized in determining the nature and extent of aliens' rights. Although he wrote
about this proposal before the Guantanamo cases, the spectrum he outlines and the
arguments he makes are very informative.
Professor Martin's spectrum has five layers. As citizenship is most central
for his analysis,426 his hierarchy of membership contains the following in a
descending scale of rights: citizens, lawful permanent residents (immigrants),
admitted non-immigrants, entrants without inspection (EWI), parolees, and
applicants at the border.427 This appears to be an ordered spectrum with some basis
in jurisprudence. The problem, however, is that the largely positive law approach
dismisses the most serious problem: the problem of EWIs or undocumented persons
with long-term residence and extensive community ties. Professor Marin argues that
"[a]n initial response might be to say that migrants consider themselves settled here
but [those] who lack LPR [lawful permanent residency] status developed
expectations that are not legitimate." 428 He adds that not only are the expectations
illegitimate but also incredible. He writes that "[fjrom the standpoint of the long-
staying migrant who lacks legal status, the issue is not solely the legitimacy of any
expectations or permanence or rootedness, but also the credibility of those
expectations." He finds the expectations not credible because those who overstay are
told that they must leave on certain dates, and those who enter without inspection,
"sneaking across-a border at night, often with the aid of a paid smuggler" and worry
424. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protection for
Aliens: The Real Meaning ofZadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 89 (2001).
425. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and 'Community Ties': A
Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 243 (1983). This was written in response to Professor
Martin's earlier piece on a related subject. See David Martin, Due Process and Membership in the
National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PIrT. L. REV. 165 (1983).
426. One of the leading textbooks on immigration, which he co-authors, begins with a chapter
on citizenship. See ALEINKOFF, ET AL., supra note 334, at chapter I. Compare with the other leading
textbook, LEGOMSKY, at chapter 13 (ending with citizenship). See also INA at title Ill (placing
citizenship and naturalization towards the end of the statute).
427. Martin, supra note 424, at 92.
428. See id. at 107.
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that "la migra will discover them" hardly create credible expectations of rootedness
worth honoring.429 He also considers the expectations of the receiving society and
cites to Alan Wolfe's book summarizing the society's sentiment as "overwhelmigly
support[ing] legal immigration and express[ing] disgust with the illegal variety."4 3
The arguments relating to the credibility of the expectations of aliens as
well as society's expectations rest on factual contentions. With respect to the
expectations of the individual aliens, it is extremely difficult to doubt the credibility
of the expectations of a seventeen year-old high school senior, who was brought in at
age one and led a normal life like the rest of his classmates, to be considered a
member of the community. In fact, the proposed Dream Act, which intends to
legalize young people in this situation, is predicated on this and similar
assumptions.
Two things can be said about the expectations of the society. First, like
every contentious political issue, the answer depends on whom you ask. There are as
many, if not more, supporters of legalization as there are opponents. It is fair to say
that no one group represents the expectations of society at large. Second, the same
issue of credibility of expectations may be raised with respect to the credibility of
expectations of the "society." Apart from the precedence of Yick Wo and Plyler v.
Doe, and occasional legalization regimes that have sufficiently upset the segment of
society that is "disgusted with the illegal variety," the likelihood of the United States
deporting all illegal aliens is not very credible. Professor Peter Schuck summarizes
the inherent dilemma relating to this issue in the following passage:
Today, large numbers of migrants can easily, inexpensively, and
surreptitiously enter United States territory, where they can readily
form social and economic attachments that the government cannot
easily sever . . .. These brute facts present liberalism with a
poignant predicament. Committed to the rule of law but
confronted by individuals who, sociologically speaking, have
found community in America only after flouting that law,
liberalism cannot legitimate their presence. Committed to the
moral primacy of consent, liberalism cannot embrace those who
enter by stealth. Committed to universal human rights, liberalism
cannot secure those rights in the real world without rooting itself in
political institutions that are actually capable of instantiating its
values.432
429. See id.
430. See id. (quoting ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL 147 (1998) (emphasis added);
Peter Skerry, Why Amnesty Is the Wrong Way to Go, WASHINGTON POsT (Aug. 12, 2001)).
431. The Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2009 called the Dream
Act has been proposed in different forms at different times, the latest version was proposed on March 26,
2009, and is still pending in both houses of Congress. For the details and progress of the current version
of the see Proposed Dream Act (2010), http://www.dreamact2009.org/. See also Michael A. Olivas,
IlRIRA, The Dream Act, and Undocumented College Students Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435 (2004)
(predicting that a combination of state and federal laws will eventually address the issue of access to
higher education for the large numbers of undocumented young high school graduates). For legislative
history and overview, see Jeffrey N. Poulin, The Piecemeal Approach Falls Short ofAchieving the Dream
of Immigration Reform, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 353 (2008).
432. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 87
(1984). Although this was written before major immigration reforms including the 1986 legalization
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Professor Martin's spectrum analysis seems to be constrained by this
dilemma. Certainly, any action that would undermine the very laws and institutions
that would secure rights and privileges in the first place, as Professor Schuck
suggests, seems to be antithetical to the concept of the rule of law. However,
ignoring the glaring sociological realities in the interest of principles that are
supposed to aid the protection of liberty and the promotion of rights is anomalous.
Sometimes, the rhetoric follows the idea that "the law is the law, and they
broke the law." Although this statement makes it sound like these undocumented
immigrants committed crimes against humanity, existing law considers illegal
crossing in a similar fashion to a misdemeanor for a first time offender. 433 The
Plyler Court did not choose to ignore the sociological reality. It recognized that the
presence of millions of undocumented children is a fact and that the country has to
deal with the issue in a manner that does not involve denying them basic education.
The Court was concerned about the children, not the parents who broke the law and
said, "the inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of basic
education each and every day of his life."434 In fact, Justice Brennan suggested that
although the children's parents broke the law, their fault is shared by society:
[L]ax enforcement of the laws barring into this country, coupled
with the failure to establish an effective bar to employment of
undocumented aliens ... encouraged by some to remain here as a
source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our
society makes available to citizens and lawful permanent
435
residents.
The expectations of undocumented children are more credible today than in
1982, when Plyler was decided. Today nearly 65,000 undocumented children
436
graduate from the nation's high schools every year. Most of them have lived in
the U.S. almost their entire lives. Strictly speaking, they are not "aliens" to U.S.
society but they lack legal status. Ignoring this glaring sociological reality on the
basis of a completely positivist view of the "law is the law," and placing
undocumented children towards the unfavorable end of the spectrum does not
resolve the problem in any meaningful and realistic way. Instead, it will continue to
disorder the alienage spectrum. The following section makes some pragmatic
suggestions on reordering the spectrum.
d. A Pragmatic Approach to Reordering the Spectrum
No legalization regime or amount of enforcement is likely to resolve the
issue of undocumented immigrants. Undocumented status will continue to
complicate the immigration debate for the foreseeable future. It is a geo-political
and socio-economic reality.
A pragmatic approach to the problem would recognize the objective reality
and the available options. Every time a comprehensive immigration reform or
scheme, the statement is equally true for today's reality.
433. See INA sec. 275 (citing that penalty is less than 6 months.).
434. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222.
435. Id. at. 218-19.
436. The Dream Act, http://www.dreamact2009.org/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
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legalization regime is contemplated, the most common proposed requirement is the
length of stay of the beneficiaries. The 1986 legalization regime, for instance,
required about four years of residency as a condition for legalization.4 3 7  The
proposed Dream Act contains similar provisions, but links length of residency with
age at the point of entry. More specifically, it couples entitlement to legal status with
entry before the age of sixteen and five years of continuous residency.
This approach of age plus length of residence is a logical formula to
determine the position of the individual on the alienage spectrum and provide
benefits commensurate with that position. For one thing, it would resolve the
enduring problem of the education of undocumented minors under Plyler. Applying
a similar formula to the adult population may also have significant benefits by
balancing the degree of culpability with the nature of community ties that develop
later. Additional revisions to existing law can further this objective, perhaps even
after a possible comprehensive immigration reform resolves the existing caseload of
undocumented immigrants.
i. Registry
One important and familiar way of avoiding the unnecessary accumulation
of undocumented immigrants is the system of registry. Currently, the Attorney
General has the discretion to legalize a long-term resident who entered illegally
before a specified date. That date used to be June 30, 1948, but a revision in 1986
438
extended it to January 1, 1972.
A change to the registry system can address the current problem; moving
from the specific-date-based-registry system, which currently benefits those who can
439
demonstrate that they entered the United States before January 1, 1972, to a
system based on the number of years of unauthorized stay.440 A formula taking into
account the alien's age and length of illegal residency may also accomplish the
objective of recognizing the community ties that ordinary people are expected to
accumulate. It can also prevent unnecessary suffering of people who have lived here
under a complex mix of social, legal and economic circumstances. Coming up with
the required level of political compromise might be difficult at this time; however,
all this requires is coming to terms with reality. The current cut-off date of January
1, 1972 obviously does little to address the current problem.
A more acceptable proposal would probably look at a five to ten year range
of continuous residency. It could, of course, be subjected to some conditions of
inadmissibility unrelated to the illegal entry. This would have the potential of
reordering the spectrum by giving long-term residents the same legal status that
persons with fewer attachments and ties may be entitled to because of their lawful
presence.
437. See IRCA, amending INA sec. 245A(a)(2)(A).
438. See INA sec. 249.
439. See id.
440. In fact, the authors of the leading immigration law treatise have long suggested this
modification, albeit not in the context of the alienage spectrum. See Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr,
54.01 (cited in LEGOMSKY, supra note 364, at 607).
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ii. Adjustment ofStatus
Adjustment of status is the principal way of acquiring lawful permanent
residency for individuals who have been inspected and admitted and later acquire
community ties by marrying citizens or obtaining job offers. 44 1 This form of relief is
442
currently not available for those who have entered illegally. This has been a
significant obstacle preventing perhaps millions of people with extensive ties from
assuming their rightful position in the spectrum.
Recognizing the severity of this obstacle, Congress has on a couple of
occasions allowed those who entered without inspection to adjust status upon
443
payment of some penalty. The last time this happened was April 2001.
Permanently eliminating the "inspected and admitted" requirement from the
adjustment of status provision would help reorder the spectrum by allowing those
who have substantial attachments, by way of marriage or jobs, to assume their
rightful position on the spectrum.
iii. Cancellation ofRemoval
Cancellation of removal, as a defense from deportation, works more or less
like registry, but has distinct features and advantages. It excuses some grounds of
deportability and also preserves or confers lawful permanent residence. In its
current formulation, it has two separate applications. The first relates to lawful
permanent residents who are deemed deportable. They may seek cancellation of
their removal in removal proceedings if they can establish that they have resided in
the U.S. for seven continuous years, five of which must be as lawful permanent
residents. The only exception is if the person has a conviction for an aggravated
446
felony. This rule is a classic spectrum rule, which assumes that seven years of
residence would enable the person to accrue substantial community ties, which
would be unfair to sever even if the person has been convicted of a minor crime.
The second cancellation of removal rule is more like registry than the first. It allows
for the cancellation of removal and status adjustment if the alien can demonstrate
four things: ten years of physical residence, good moral character, no convictions,
and "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent or
child, who is a citizen or an alien admitted for lawful permanent residence."447 This
is also a classic spectrum rule; however, it is encumbered almost to the point of
irrelevancy. The standard, "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship," cannot be
met by the vast majority of claimants.4 8 Any reform effort genuinely attempting to
make this form of relief available for persons who have established significant
441. See INA sec. 245(a) (requiring lawful entry for adjustment).
442. See id.
443. See INA sec. 245(i).
444. Other requirements include having an approved petition for an immigrant visa, which
must be available at the time of adjustment and, of course, the alien must be admissible. See INA 245(a).
445. See INA sec. 240A(a) & (b).
446. See INA sec. 240A(a).
447. See INA sec. 240A(b).
448. See, e.g., Matter of Andazola, 23 1. & N. Dec. 319 (B.I.A. 2002) (denying relief to a
mother of two U.S. citizen children who would be denied educational benefits and uprooted from their
community where the family owned a house and some other property).
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community ties for ten years and who show good moral character would eliminate
the showing of a hardship element entirely.449 That would allow the beneficiaries of
this provision to assume their rightful place in the alienage spectrum.
The three simple and effective administrative legal reforms discussed above
would not only help reorder the current disordered spectrum, but would also give
immigration laws continued viability. The proposed reforms achieve this goal by
eliminating or at least minimizing the need for a major legalization program every
two or three decades, and thereby avoiding the attending costs and the inevitable
political turmoil.
V. CONCLUSION
The awkward position in which Ping puts aliens vis-a-vis the Constitution
caused an enduring tug-of-war between those who view the Constitution as a pact
among a select group of people with the authority to exclude all others450 and those
who view the Constitution as a grand norm that enshrines the principle of mutuality,
restraint on the exercise of government power, and recognition of God-given
rights.45 1 While for the former, some special provisions have been preserved for the
"people" as opposed to "all persons," 452 for the latter "bestowing rights and
delineating protected groups would have been inconsistent with the Drafters'
fundamental conception of a Bill of Rights as a limitation on the Government's
conduct with respect to all whom it seeks to govern."453  In the alienage
jurisprudence of the last century, neither of these two schools of thought has
consistently prevailed and this has caused an enduring disorder in the spectrum. The
spectrum itself originated as a reaction to the sweeping plenary power doctrine. The
perceived injustice of subjecting those who had already established roots in the
community to swift deportation rules brought about a move towards according them
better rights. The jurisprudence that began by making a distinction between those
who just arrived and those who have some roots became entangled with addressing
the nature of the claimed rights and variations in rootedness.
At times, the disorder took the shape of provisions that applied to one group
but not another, unless certain conditions were met. Other inconsistencies are
typified when a court applies the Fifth Amendment but not the Fourth, because the
Fifth says "person" while the Fourth is limited to the "people." 454 Ordinarily, the
several states cannot discriminate on the basis of alienage,455 but the federal
government may.456 Nonetheless, the states may also discriminate on the basis of
449. Former law required only "extreme hardship." See in re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 56 (B.I.A. 2001) (comparing the two different standards).
450. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
451. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez may be cited as an example of
this. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 288.
452. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 266 ("The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to
protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never
suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens
outside of the United States territory.").
453. Id. at 288.
454. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV, V.
455. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (subjecting state alienage laws to strict
scrutiny).
456. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (applying the rational relations test).
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alienage if the area of regulation involves the political process, which may occupy
almost every area of regulation such as the position of fire fighters.457 The federal
government may detain an alien indefinitely,458 but only if the alien is not a
permanent resident.459 However, in other cases even an arriving alien may not be
detained indefinitely.46 Still, if the alien is still in deportation proceedings, he may
be detained without considering his dangerousness or likelihood of absconding.
What began as an equitable and humanitarian principle of sparing those
with community ties from brutal rules of exclusion has grown into a complex and
uncertain legal labyrinth. The introduction in recent decades of the concept of
"community consent" to "community ties or rootedness" disconnected the law from
the sociological reality and exacerbated the disorder in the spectrum, which was
originally meant to preserve social attachments, community ties, and rootedness.
Moreover, the notion of consent never completely replaced the notion of rootedness.
Rather, the two coexist, preventing the emergence of coherent and predictable
alienage jurisprudence.
As discussed throughout this article, the result of this back and forth
movement was a disordered spectrum. Today, the state of the disorder is such that
those who are supposed to be at the very beginning of the spectrum, i.e., "enemy
aliens," may be entitled to more rights than those at the opposite end of the spectrum,
i.e., lawful permanent residents or even citizens.462 Although the recognition of the
rights of 'enemy aliens' is a welcome development, its impact in exacerbating the
disorder cannot be ignored. As indicated in a previous section, however, reordering
the spectrum must not be accomplished by reducing the rights of those who are
better positioned on the spectrum, as Chief Justice Roberts suggests, but by
according the others better rights. That would in turn require the overruling of Ping.
While Ping is a Plessy-era law, it is still alive and well. Over the last century, Ping
perpetuated the disorder by vitiating judicial and political decisions. It has been
undermined over the years but has not yet received the final blow. The Guantanamo
cases, particularly Boumediene, came close, but Boumediene is not Brown.
However, it appears that it has properly paved the way for the Brown equivalent of
the alienage issue. Until the Brown equivalent arrives, however, some modest
modifications may be made to the existing rules to better manage the disorder.
These changes include amending some of the requirements of the familiar remedies
of registry, adjustment of status, and cancellation of removal in a manner that takes
into account the alien's position on the alienage spectrum, as manifested by the age-
to-residence ratio, community ties, and other indicators of rootedness.
The exercise of absolute power by one branch of government without
checks, balances, or judicial oversight is exactly the kind of tyranny that necessitated
the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. For anyone who wonders what
the conditions of the U.S. citizenry would have looked like without the Bill of
Rights, there can be no better illustration than the conditions of aliens under the
457. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 643 (1073) (carving out a political participation
exception).
458. See Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
459. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
460. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
461. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
462. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2287 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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plenary power doctrine. There is no longer any justification for maintaining a pre-
rights era rule of exclusion. Alienage must stop being an excuse for the denial of
rights. "One law shall there be, the same for those who are home-born and for the
sojourners among us. 463
463. Exodus, 12:49.
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